Administrative firing costs

, 123–124

Advertising

, 77

Analytical techniques

, 9

Android ecosystem

, 27

Antitrust authorities

, 78, 83

Antitrust regulators

, 83

Antitrust remedies

, 78–79

Apple

, 37

Attention caps

, 82–85

Attention costs, compensating users for

, 84

Attention economy

, 76

behavioral remedies for

, 82–85

distributive effects of legal intervention

, 89–91

market-based remedies for attention economy

, 85–89

in social media markets

, 77–78

structural remedies for

, 78–82

Attention monopoly, paradox of

, 81–82

Attention taxes

, 83–85

Auction rules

, 86–87

Average Revenue per User (ARPU)

, 77

Backward induction process

, 59

Basing policy

, 24

Behavioral antitrust remedies

, 82

Behavioral remedies for attention economy

, 82–85

informational problems of behavioral remedies

, 84–85

modified attention tax

, 84

price-based behavioral remedies

, 83–84

quantity-based behavioral remedies

, 82–83

Businesses

, 8

Cash flows

, 22–23

Central and Eastern European (CEE)

, 100

Chadwick–Demsetz auctions

, 91

Chadwick–Demsetz scheme

, 86

Chadwick–Demsetz solution

, 86–87

Collapsed instrument matrix

, 140

Competition

, 7–8, 28

policy

, 11–12

Competition enforcement

, 11

Competition law

issue of “data power” in

, 56–57

new challenges of

, 54–56

Competitive process

, 89

Consumers

, 55

sovereignty

, 54–56

surplus

, 24–27

Contestability

, 63–64

Conventional economic wisdom

, 81

Core platform services

, 13

Cost/benefits analysis methodology

, 24, 33

Critical optimism

, 61–64

Cross-border trade

, 32–33

Cross-country studies

, 122, 125

“Data accumulation” problem

, 54

Data power

, 54

issue of data power in competition law

, 56–57

Data processing consent

, 54

Data subject

, 55

Demand-side model

, 26

Democracy backsliding

, 109

Democracy in European Union

data

, 101–106

general public’s satisfaction with democracy

, 102–106

indexes of quality of democracy

, 101–102

overlapping of perspectives

, 106–107

significant changes of democratic assessment

, 107–114

Democracy Index

, 102

Democracy measurement approach

, 102, 104

Democratic system

, 101

Digital commerce and platforms

, 20

Digital environment

, 59

Digital market

, 56–57

Digital markets

, 1–2

Digital Markets Act (DMA)

, 1–2, 6, 10

background

, 10–12

costs and benefits in impact assessment

, 13–44

costs in impact assessment

, 33–44

Digital Markets Act (DMA)

, 54, 61, 64

thresholds

, 57–61

Digital platforms

, 60

scenario

, 57

Digitization

, 33

of commerce

, 33

Dismissals

, 124

Distributive effects of legal intervention

, 89–91

Divested networks

, 80–81

Dynamic competition

, 10–12

Econometric strategy

, 122–123

Economic assessment of DMA

, 6

Economists

, 8

EIU Democracy Index

, 104, 106–107

EIU index

, 102

Employment

, 19–20

distribution by education and temporary employment

, 137

protection

, 123–124

Employment protection legislation (EPL)

, 121–122

Endogeneity

, 138–142

EU accession

, 100

EU consumer law

, 56

European Commission (EC)

, 1–2, 6

analysis

, 22

Impact Assessment

, 1–2

Regulatory Scrutiny Board

, 38–39

European Commission

, 64

European Economic Area (EEA)

, 58

European Parliament

, 6

European Social Survey (ESS)

, 104

European telecommunications sector

, 28–29

European Union, The

, 43

Experts

, 101

Facebook

, 77, 79

Fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND)

, 34–35

Federal Trade Commission (FTC)

, 78–79

Firing costs

, 122–123

Firing notification

, 122–123

changes in

, 138

data

, 126–130

empirical analysis

, 130–142

empirical literature

, 124–125

labor market features

, 133–138

literature review

, 123–126

procedures

, 125–126

restrictions

, 136

summary statistics

, 129–130

theoretical literature

, 123–124

variables

, 126–129

Firing restrictions

, 123–124

Float glass process

, 40–42

“Free and fair” elections

, 104

Gatekeeping power, lock-in effect as guiding principle for interpretation of

, 64–66

General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)

, 54–55

General-purpose technologies

, 11

Generalized method of moments (GMM)

, 140

German antitrust law

, 54

German authority

, 55

German Competition Authority

, 63

Google

, 18

Gross domestic product (GDP)

, 9

growth

, 15–19

Ground-shaking events

, 114

HHI index

, 30

High thresholds mechanism

, 59

House Antitrust Subcommittee

, 79

Human attention

, 77

Human capital investment

, 124

ILOSTAT

, 128–129

Impact Assessment

, 6, 8–9, 12

analysis

, 10, 25–26

benefits considered in impact assessment

, 15–33

benefits from investment in R&D

, 24

competition

, 27–31

consumer surplus

, 24–27

costs and benefits considered in

, 13–14, 44

costs considered in

, 33–44

costs to commission

, 33–34

costs to ecosystem users and broader economy

, 36–43

costs to national authorities

, 34

costs to platforms

, 34–36

cross-border trade

, 32–33

employment

, 19–20

GDP growth

, 15–19

impacts on small and medium enterprises

, 44

innovation

, 20–24

internal market fragmentation

, 31–32

modeling

, 25

technology transfer

, 43

Impact Assessment, The

, 16–17, 25

Impact Assessment Annexes, The

, 27

Information

, 104–105

Information and Communication Technology (ICT)

, 14–15

Innovation

, 20, 24, 28

innovation-based dynamic competition

, 28–29

Input–output models

, 9, 15–16, 18

Instagram

, 54, 63, 79

Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS)

, 126–128

Internal market fragmentation

, 31–32

Interpersonal communication services

, 8

Investment in R&D, benefits from

, 24

Italian reform

, 124–125

Job security provisions

, 125

Labor economics

, 121–122

Legal intervention, distributive effects of

, 89–91

Liberal criteria

, 104

Local construction industry

, 15–16

Lock-in effect as guiding principle for interpretation of gatekeeping power

, 64–66

Lockin effect

, 54

Market-based remedies for attention economy

, 85–89

competing for monopoly

, 86–87

social media as Vickrey common

, 87–89

Market-based solutions

, 2

Market-redefining dynamic competition

, 28–29

Market-redefining innovation

, 28

Matching models

, 123–124

“Me too” innovation

, 20

Media-sharing platform services

, 8

Mergers and acquisitions activity (M&A activity)

, 9

Microsoft

, 43

Minimum wage growth

, 136

Modified attention tax

, 84

Monopoly, competing for

, 86–87

National Authorities

, 33

costs to

, 34

National employment agency

, 3

Network effects

, 60, 64, 76, 79

One-fits-all approach

, 59

Online marketplaces

, 8

Optimal caps

, 83

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

, 122

synthetic index

, 122

Paradox of attention monopoly

, 81–82

Periodic auction

, 88

Pigouvian tax

, 83–85

Platforms

, 37, 57, 61

Political system

, 105–106

“Positive-price markets” in social media

, 89

Power

, 56–57, 65

imbalances

, 54, 56

Price-based behavioral remedies

, 83–85

Privacy calculus

, 56

Privacy paradox

, 56

Quantitative metrics

, 104

Quantity-based behavioral remedies

, 82–85

Reddit

, 76

Regression analysis

, 101

Regulation

, 8

Research and development (R&D)

, 7

benefits from investment in

, 24

Satisfaction with democracy

, 101, 104

Search engines

, 8

Severance pay and firing notification restrictions

, 137–138

Shocks

, 15–16

Small and medium enterprises (SMEs)

, 44

impacts on

, 44

Social media

attention economy in social media markets

, 77–78

networks

, 75–77, 80–82, 84

platform

, 56

as Vickrey common

, 87–89

Social networking services

, 8

Static competition

, 10–12

Static economic analysis

, 12

Statista’s latest report

, 77

Structural remedies for attention economy

, 78–82

efficiency of

, 79–80

paradox of attention monopoly

, 81–82

sustainability of

, 80–81

Substantial divergence

, 2–3

Super Bowl games

, 77

Sustainability of structural remedies

, 80–81

Technology transfer

, 43

Two-sided market antitrust analysis

, 60

Uber

, 29

Unemployment

, 121–122, 125

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

, 128–129

V-Dem

, 102

liberal democracy index

, 104, 109

Vickrey auctions

, 87–88, 91

Vickrey Commons auction

, 88, 91

Vocational training

, 136

Wage bargaining

involvement

, 133

process

, 3

Wage growth estimation

, 130–133

Wages

, 121–122

WeChat

, 76

WhatsApp

, 54, 63, 76

World Bank database

, 128–129

YouTube

, 76

Zero-price social media markets

, 91

Zero–price markets

, 76, 78