

INDEX

- Administrative firing costs, 123–124
- Advertising, 77
- Analytical techniques, 9
- Android ecosystem, 27
- Antitrust authorities, 78, 83
- Antitrust regulators, 83
- Antitrust remedies, 78–79
- Apple, 37
- Attention caps, 82–85
- Attention costs, compensating users for, 84
- Attention economy, 76
 - behavioral remedies for, 82–85
 - distributive effects of legal intervention, 89–91
 - market-based remedies for attention economy, 85–89
 - in social media markets, 77–78
 - structural remedies for, 78–82
- Attention monopoly, paradox of, 81–82
- Attention taxes, 83–85
- Auction rules, 86–87
- Average Revenue per User (ARPU), 77

- Backward induction process, 59
- Basing policy, 24
- Behavioral antitrust remedies, 82
- Behavioral remedies for attention economy, 82–85
 - informational problems of behavioral remedies, 84–85
 - modified attention tax, 84
 - price-based behavioral remedies, 83–84
 - quantity-based behavioral remedies, 82–83

- Businesses, 8

- Cash flows, 22–23
- Central and Eastern European (CEE), 100
- Chadwick–Demsetz auctions, 91
- Chadwick–Demsetz scheme, 86
- Chadwick–Demsetz solution, 86–87
- Collapsed instrument matrix, 140
- Competition, 7–8, 28
 - policy, 11–12
- Competition enforcement, 11
- Competition law
 - issue of “data power” in, 56–57
 - new challenges of, 54–56
- Competitive process, 89
- Consumers, 55
 - sovereignty, 54–56
 - surplus, 24–27
- Contestability, 63–64
- Conventional economic wisdom, 81
- Core platform services, 13
- Cost/benefits analysis methodology, 24, 33
- Critical optimism, 61–64
- Cross-border trade, 32–33
- Cross-country studies, 122, 125

- “Data accumulation” problem, 54
- Data power, 54
 - issue of data power in competition law, 56–57
- Data processing consent, 54
- Data subject, 55
- Demand-side model, 26
- Democracy backsliding, 109
- Democracy in European Union
 - data, 101–106
 - general public’s satisfaction with democracy, 102–106

- indexes of quality of democracy, 101–102
- overlapping of perspectives, 106–107
- significant changes of democratic assessment, 107–114
- Democracy Index*, 102
- Democracy measurement approach, 102, 104
- Democratic system, 101
- Digital commerce and platforms, 20
- Digital environment, 59
- Digital market, 56–57
- Digital markets, 1–2
- Digital Markets Act (DMA), 1–2, 6, 10
 - background, 10–12
 - costs and benefits in impact assessment, 13–44
 - costs in impact assessment, 33–44
- Digital Markets Act (DMA), 54, 61, 64
 - thresholds, 57–61
- Digital platforms, 60
 - scenario, 57
- Digitization, 33
 - of commerce, 33
- Dismissals, 124
- Distributive effects of legal intervention, 89–91
- Divested networks, 80–81
- Dynamic competition, 10–12
- Econometric strategy, 122–123
- Economic assessment of DMA, 6
- Economists, 8
- EIU Democracy Index, 104, 106–107
- EIU index, 102
- Employment, 19–20
 - distribution by education and temporary employment, 137
 - protection, 123–124
- Employment protection legislation (EPL), 121–122
- Endogeneity, 138–142
- EU accession, 100
- EU consumer law, 56
- European Commission (EC), 1–2, 6
 - analysis, 22
 - Impact Assessment, 1–2
 - Regulatory Scrutiny Board, 38–39
- European Commission, 64
- European Economic Area (EEA), 58
- European Parliament, 6
- European Social Survey (ESS), 104
- European telecommunications sector, 28–29
- European Union, The, 43
- Experts, 101
- Facebook, 77, 79
- Fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND), 34–35
- Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 78–79
- Firing costs, 122–123
- Firing notification, 122–123
 - changes in, 138
 - data, 126–130
 - empirical analysis, 130–142
 - empirical literature, 124–125
 - labor market features, 133–138
 - literature review, 123–126
 - procedures, 125–126
 - restrictions, 136
 - summary statistics, 129–130
 - theoretical literature, 123–124
 - variables, 126–129
- Firing restrictions, 123–124
- Float glass process, 40–42
- “Free and fair” elections, 104
- Gatekeeping power, lock-in effect as guiding principle for interpretation of, 64–66
- General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 54–55
- General-purpose technologies, 11
- Generalized method of moments (GMM), 140

- German antitrust law, 54
- German authority, 55
- German Competition Authority, 63
- Google, 18
- Gross domestic product (GDP), 9
 - growth, 15–19
- Ground-shaking events, 114

- HHI index, 30
- High thresholds mechanism, 59
- House Antitrust Subcommittee, 79
- Human attention, 77
- Human capital investment, 124

- ILOSTAT, 128–129
- Impact Assessment, 6, 8–9, 12
 - analysis, 10, 25–26
 - benefits considered in impact assessment, 15–33
 - benefits from investment in R&D, 24
 - competition, 27–31
 - consumer surplus, 24–27
 - costs and benefits considered in, 13–14, 44
 - costs considered in, 33–44
 - costs to commission, 33–34
 - costs to ecosystem users and broader economy, 36–43
 - costs to national authorities, 34
 - costs to platforms, 34–36
 - cross-border trade, 32–33
 - employment, 19–20
 - GDP growth, 15–19
 - impacts on small and medium enterprises, 44
 - innovation, 20–24
 - internal market fragmentation, 31–32
 - modeling, 25
 - technology transfer, 43
- Impact Assessment, The, 16–17, 25
- Impact Assessment Annexes, The, 27
- Information, 104–105
- Information and Communication Technology (ICT), 14–15
- Innovation, 20, 24, 28
 - innovation-based dynamic competition, 28–29
- Input–output models, 9, 15–16, 18
- Instagram, 54, 63, 79
- Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS), 126–128
- Internal market fragmentation, 31–32
- Interpersonal communication services, 8
- Investment in R&D, benefits from, 24
- Italian reform, 124–125

- Job security provisions, 125

- Labor economics, 121–122
- Legal intervention, distributive effects of, 89–91
- Liberal criteria, 104
- Local construction industry, 15–16
- Lock-in effect as guiding principle for interpretation of gate-keeping power, 64–66
- Lockin effect, 54

- Market-based remedies for attention economy, 85–89
 - competing for monopoly, 86–87
 - social media as Vickrey common, 87–89
- Market-based solutions, 2
- Market-redefining dynamic competition, 28–29
- Market-redefining innovation, 28
- Matching models, 123–124
- “Me too” innovation, 20
- Media-sharing platform services, 8
- Mergers and acquisitions activity (M&A activity), 9
- Microsoft, 43

- Minimum wage growth, 136
 Modified attention tax, 84
 Monopoly, competing for, 86–87
- National Authorities, 33
 costs to, 34
 National employment agency, 3
 Network effects, 60, 64, 76, 79
- One-fits-all approach, 59
 Online marketplaces, 8
 Optimal caps, 83
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 122
 synthetic index, 122
- Paradox of attention monopoly, 81–82
 Periodic auction, 88
 Pigouvian tax, 83–85
 Platforms, 37, 57, 61
 Political system, 105–106
 “Positive-price markets” in social media, 89
 Power, 56–57, 65
 imbalances, 54, 56
 Price-based behavioral remedies, 83–85
 Privacy calculus, 56
 Privacy paradox, 56
- Quantitative metrics, 104
 Quantity-based behavioral remedies, 82–85
- Reddit, 76
 Regression analysis, 101
 Regulation, 8
 Research and development (R&D), 7
 benefits from investment in, 24
- Satisfaction with democracy, 101, 104
 Search engines, 8
- Severance pay and firing notification restrictions, 137–138
 Shocks, 15–16
 Small and medium enterprises (SMEs), 44
 impacts on, 44
 Social media
 attention economy in social media markets, 77–78
 networks, 75–77, 80–82, 84
 platform, 56
 as Vickrey common, 87–89
 Social networking services, 8
 Static competition, 10–12
 Static economic analysis, 12
 Statista’s latest report, 77
 Structural remedies for attention economy, 78–82
 efficiency of, 79–80
 paradox of attention monopoly, 81–82
 sustainability of, 80–81
 Substantial divergence, 2–3
Super Bowl games, 77
 Sustainability of structural remedies, 80–81
- Technology transfer, 43
 Two-sided market antitrust analysis, 60
- Uber, 29
 Unemployment, 121–122, 125
 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 128–129
- V-Dem, 102
 liberal democracy index, 104, 109
 Vickrey auctions, 87–88, 91
 Vickrey Commons auction, 88, 91
 Vocational training, 136

- Wage bargaining
 - involvement, 133
 - process, 3
- Wage growth estimation, 130–133
- Wages, 121–122
- WeChat, 76
- WhatsApp, 54, 63, 76
- World Bank database, 128–129
- YouTube, 76
- Zero-price social media markets, 91
- Zero-price markets, 76, 78