Designing geographical indication institutions when stakeholders’ incentives are not perfectly aligned

Abstract

Purpose

Geographical Indications (GI) are complex and multi-purpose institutions. Their objectives include encouraging diversification of agricultural production, improving farmers’ income, countering depopulation of rural areas, satisfying consumer demand for high-quality good, and protecting consumers from food fraud. The authors argue that such objectives are not necessarily aligned as divergence may arise among stakeholders (such as farmers, consumers or rural communities) about the optimal design of the GI. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors developed a simple, static game-theory model describing the basic choices that a planner faces in designing a GI.

Findings

The authors conclude that the optimal organization requires finding trade-offs among conflicting but equally desirable objectives. Perfect monitoring is not a sufficient condition to resolve such conflicts. Sub-consortia and flexible production agreements may increase the efficiency of a GI.

Research limitations/implications

The authors described basic trade-offs in GI design using the simplest possible model. To this purpose the authors introduced limiting assumptions that may be relaxed in future research. The representation of the GI agreement focussed on the quality level only, abstracting from all other consideration. Using a static model prevented us from explicit modeling of (loss of) reputation effects. The simplifying assumptions about consumer behavior and cost functions have reduced the generality of the results. Extensions of the model may consider introducing additional elements in the GI agreement such as production areas or governance models, dynamic games and general functional forms.

Practical implications

The authors found that in designing a GI: first, promotion approaches revolving around small groups of local leaders (i.e. efficient, high-quality producers) might overshoot quality, resulting in unsustainable production agreements; second, introducing degrees of flexibility in the production agreement may help achieving a sustainable GI; and finally, sub-consortia/optional labels may help dealing with producers’ heterogeneity.

Social implications

The authors found that setting a high standard in the production agreement is not sufficient condition for delivering quality food to consumers, as producers might have incentive to commit frauds. A simple command and control approach to quality in GI’s is not always the most efficient strategy, because it may reduce participation. In designing the GI, the goals of identity preservation and food quality must be balanced with consideration of producers’ incentives. The involvement of producers in the design of the GI is a critical success driver. Yet, this practice can be problematic because of producers’ heterogeneity.

Originality/value

The paper provides theoretical foundation for best practices in forming a GI, including: multi-stakeholder involvement, management of farmer heterogeneity and monitoring.

Citation

Di Fonzo, A. and Russo, C. (2015), "Designing geographical indication institutions when stakeholders’ incentives are not perfectly aligned", British Food Journal, Vol. 117 No. 10, pp. 2484-2500. https://doi.org/10.1108/BFJ-12-2014-0392