Organizational factors that contribute to police deadly force liability

Citation

Chou, M. (2010), "Organizational factors that contribute to police deadly force liability", Policing: An International Journal, Vol. 33 No. 4. https://doi.org/10.1108/pijpsm.2010.18133dab.002

Organizational factors that contribute to police deadly force liability

Organizational factors that contribute to police deadly force liability

Article Type: Perspectives on policing From: Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, Volume 33, Issue 4

Hoon Lee and Michael S. VaughnJournal of Criminal JusticeVol. 382010pp. 193-206

Lethal encounters between police officers and the public are acknowledged as part of an officer’s duty and can occur under a variety of conditions. However, unnecessary use of deadly force is a universal concern for law enforcement agencies, as it creates unwanted legal litigations and diminishes police accountability in the public’s eye. Excessive force is defined as use of force that is “unreasonable or unnecessary to accomplish a legal objective” (Lee and Vaughn, 2010, pp. 193). Notable incidents such as the Rodney King Case have caused community hostility, federal investigations, and criminal and civil liabilities. Previous research has examined situational, environmental, and organizational causes of excessive deadly force and found that organizational policies have the greatest effect in curtailing its occurrence.

The emergence of police use of deadly force as a major public issue originated in the 1960s and 1970s. Although landmark federal cases, such as Tennessee v. Garner (1985) and Graham v. Connor (1989), have established the constitutional limits on excessive use of force, the nuances and applicability of these limitations are still decided on a case-by-case basis. These cases have forced police administrators to adopt policies and procedures that guide an officer’s behavior in situations involving deadly force. Extending the research on organizational influence on deadly force, this qualitative study seeks to address the civil liability caused by excessive deadly force within the context of a collapse in administrative command and control. The authors hypothesize that the increase in civil liabilities occurs when officers are poorly supervised, inadequately trained, and lack communication and accountability.

Federal cases in which departments and municipalities were charged with police use of excessive deadly force were analyzed. State cases were omitted because litigations under state law vary in their court precedents and standards. Two specific cases, Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services (1978) and City of Canton v. Harris (1989), were used as the beginning foundation in the search for relevant civil liability cases. A total of 86 cases, all involving police shootings, fit the search criteria. These cases were analyzed for patterns of officer misconduct, unconstitutional policies, and inadequate training.

The findings regarding patterns of individual officer actions revealed use of deadly force against surrendering suspects, uncooperative suspects, and/or negligence as the primary causes of liability. Cases in which officers were found accountable for excessive deadly force revealed several underlying triggers. First, officers applied excessive force towards surrendering or uncooperative suspects due to their psychological fear of losing control of the situation. Uncooperative suspects also include individuals who are mentally ill or intoxicated. Second, a condition known as “adrenalin overload” often led to the application of deadly force. This is especially prevalent after high-speed chases and foot pursuits, in which the officer manifests their frustration of the situation towards the suspect. Third, although infrequent, informal retribution or “street justice” occurs when officers overstep or abuse their authority to punish a suspect. Abuse of authority also applies when officers fail to separate their private life with their occupational role and exercise deadly force in personal altercations. Fourth, officers were held accountable when they failed to exercise restraint in suicide by cop situations, especially when confronted by a mentally unstable or intoxicated individual. Lastly, careless behavior such as misidentification of suspects, cross-fires, and firearm mishaps were categorized as excessive deadly force.

The fallout from poor split-second decisions may result in the officer being found liable for the outcome of the situation. Especially in tense or potentially violent encounters, officers are susceptible to “split-second syndromes,” which may limit their ability to accurately calculate threat levels. The split-second syndrome often results from suspects hiding, dim settings, and officers’ speculation about the level of danger. In these encounters, officers have less time to prepare themselves and it is the perceived increase in level of danger that takes over the officers’ discretion to use deadly force. In these situations, officers were found to be accountable if the suspect was unarmed, did not pose an immediate danger, or in events of contagious shooting. However, officers were justified in their shooting when experiencing physical threat to their life or that of another officer or bystander.

Lee and Vaughn also analyzed these cases to determine the causes of departmental liability outside of individual officer behavior. They found that the department was held liable in cases of:

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  drawing a gun while handcuffing suspects;

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  inadequate force continuum procedures;

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  improper off-duty policies;

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  code of silence; and

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  failure to properly train police officers.

The authors highlighted several aspects of inadequate training regarding the proper use of deadly force. First, officers were not properly trained to control their emotions in high-speed pursuits, which, combined with an absence of policy regarding the use of deadly force during and after high-speed pursuits, produced a deficit in administrative oversight. The same applies when officers have to deal with uncooperative, mentally ill, or intoxicated individuals. Second, officers were not trained in low light shooting or bunch shooting, which drastically amplifies the potential for contagious shootings. Lastly, even when officers were properly trained, lax requalification policies fail to instill the training throughout the police career.

In conclusion, organizational policies and procedures have been the most successful method for controlling police discretion regarding deadly force. This study showed that a breakdown of administration control and supervision is a significant source of civil liability regarding excessive deadly force. The analysis showed that “in many of the cases reviewed, basic managerial principles appeared to be absent … leading to a lack of control, collapse of the hierarchy of authority, and unguided goals and objectives” (Lee and Vaughn, 2010, pp. 202-203). To remedy this oversight, police administrators should place strong emphasis on solid managerial principles and organizational policies.

Michael ChouUniversity of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH, USA