Common Agency Theory, Corporate Governance, and Not-for-Profit Organizations

Abstract

The chapter contributes to the theoretical understanding of how corporate governance affects organizational processes and outcomes in not-for-profit organizations. The contribution claims that cooperation is not only a good proposition held by the variety of actors relevant to corporate governance of non-for-profit organizations, but it also determines the wealth maximization of organization's stakeholders. Theoretical results, according to the common agency framework, are driven by the case study of the largest humanitarian organization’ corporate governance: the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).

Citation

Romano, M. (2013), "Common Agency Theory, Corporate Governance, and Not-for-Profit Organizations", Gnan, L., Hinna, A. and Monteduro, F. (Ed.) Conceptualizing and Researching Governance in Public and Non-Profit Organizations (Studies in Public and Non-Profit Governance, Vol. 1), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 91-113. https://doi.org/10.1108/S2051-6630(2013)0000001008