

# INTRODUCTION: UNIVERSITY COLLEGIALITY AND THE EROSION OF FACULTY AUTHORITY

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## ABSTRACT

*Recent changes in university systems, debates on academic freedom, and changing roles of knowledge in society all point to questions regarding how higher education and research should be governed and the role of scientists and faculty in this. Rationalizations of systems of higher education and research have been accompanied by the questioning and erosion of faculty authority and challenges to academic collegiality. In light of these developments, we see a need for a more conceptually precise discussion about what academic collegiality is, how it is practiced, how collegial forms of governance may be supported or challenged by other forms of governance, and finally, why collegial governance of higher education and research is important.*

*We see collegiality as an institution of self-governance that includes formal rules and structures for decision-making, normative and cognitive underpinnings of identities and purposes, and specific practices. Studies of collegiality then, need to capture structures and rules as well as identities, norms, purposes and practices. Distinguishing between vertical and horizontal collegiality, we show how they balance and support each other.*

*Universities are subject to mixed modes of governance related to the many tasks and missions that higher education and research is expected to fulfill. Mixed modes of governance also stem from reforms based on widely held ideals of*

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*governance and organization. We examine university reforms and challenges to collegiality through the lenses of three ideal types of governance – collegiality, bureaucracy and enterprise – and combinations thereof.*

**Keywords:** Collegiality as an institution; governance modes; university governance; vertical collegiality; horizontal collegiality; governance mix

## INTRODUCTION

The higher education and research system is both accommodating and reproducing a continuous dilemma. On the one hand, following Humboldtian ideals, research and higher education is expected to be run by autonomous interrelated academic communities in a system often described as collegial governance. On the other hand, research and higher education is an instrument for the fulfillment of certain goals external to the academic community, and governance and control are tailored for this purpose, typically in line with bureaucratic or enterprise models. As a consequence of this continuous dilemma, universities and the higher education system of which they are a part become contexts where various governance models intersect. Different ways of governing express different aims of higher education and research and hence different views on what is to be governed, by whom and with what means.

Universities are among the oldest and most sustainable institutions on earth. Since the first universities were established more than a millennium ago, we have seen astonishing growth in higher education and research worldwide, especially during the past 50 years (Frank & Meyer, 2020). At the same time, throughout their long histories, academic systems all over the world have experienced recurrent transformations in the ways they are governed. These transformations have followed societal and political changes, waves of organizational reforms, and shifts in the nature of stratification among faculty, students, and administrators. Research on recent governance transformations has shown how higher education and research have been subject to rationalization and organization according to widely held bureaucratic and enterprise (often also termed as managerial) ideas and ideals (Barnes, 2020; Czarniawska, 2019; Fleming, 2020; Hüther & Krücken, 2016; Krücken, 2011; Krücken & Meier, 2006; Macfarlane, 2005; Marginson, 2000; Marginson & Considine, 2000; Musselin, 2018; Parker & Jary, 1995; Ramirez, 2006, 2010; Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist, 2016b; Tuchman, 2009). These reforms do not seem to have followed a grand plan, but have been introduced piecemeal and have only partly been tied to changed missions, tasks, and roles of research and higher education. Even so, it is clear that changed modes of governance have both been driven by and driven changes in the missions, roles, and tasks of higher education and research. Modes of governance change both what is to be governed and by whom.

Studies of individual universities, national university systems and international comparisons have documented and analyzed governance changes, what

drives them and with what consequences. As is the case more generally in studies of changed and reformed governance, we argue that studies involving universities focus more on what is new than on what is left behind, dissolved, or torn down. Previous and challenged modes of governance are likely to be taken for granted or referred to as well-known. It may even be the case that the lack of clarification and analysis of those challenged forms of governance make them less likely to be sustained. Recent changes to university systems, debates on academic freedom, and changing roles of knowledge in society all point to questions regarding how higher education and research should be governed and what roles scientists and faculty have.

Rationalizations of systems of higher education and research have been accompanied by the questioning or erosion of faculty authority and challenges to collegiality. But what is collegiality, and how can it work in practice? What role does it presuppose for academic faculty and other groups (such as administrators, students, members of broader society, etc.) in governance processes? What conditions are necessary for collegiality to work and how does collegiality as a mode of governance change with changed conditions and when mixed with other modes of governance? We see a need for a more conceptually precise discussion about what collegiality is, how it is practiced, how collegial forms of governance may be supported or challenged by other forms of governance, and finally, why collegial governance of higher education and research is important.

Papers in the two volumes of this special issue develop notions and understandings of collegiality; describe and analyze how collegiality is challenged, but also translated and practiced in different settings around the world; and provide insights into procedures that result from encounters between diverse modes of governing. Articles range from historical accounts of university reforms and the practice of collegiality over time, studies of current governing practices and challenges, and conceptual developments of collegiality, to normative accounts of how collegiality can be practiced in contemporary systems of higher education and research as a way to uphold the integrity and quality of those systems. Both volumes adopt a comparative lens to developments related to university governance and collegiality. While most papers are based on studies in individual countries or individual university settings, comparisons across settings reveal interesting dynamics of globalization, homogenization, and variation.

The first volume concentrates on challenges to collegiality and the erosion of faculty authority. Scholars analyze global waves of reforms, ways in which various managerial modes of organization and control come to reshape universities, and how these interplay with the changing missions of universities. The political context also challenges collegiality and partly erodes faculty authority. The second volume directs our attention to limitations to collegiality and analyzes how collegiality is revised and perhaps even restored. A normative discussion of this volume centers around how collegiality may be revitalized. An argument supporting a return to collegiality – both in the analysis of developments of systems of higher education and research and in the actual governing of universities – runs through this volume.

The authors of this double volume are affiliated with universities in more than 10 countries representing six continents. In addition, several authors have had experiences in several other countries. Contributors have collaborated on this three-year project in workshops, both in real life and over Zoom during the COVID-19 pandemic. In this way, studies and papers have been shaped in a continuous dialogue, ensuring that a thematic comparative perspective runs through both volumes. These thematic comparisons are visible throughout the volumes. Related questions are addressed in several papers, and as the many cross references show, the contributions partly build on each other. We end the special issue with a paper collectively authored by the contributors to both volumes that outlines an agenda for future research on collegiality and discusses practical implications for today's universities.

We continue this introduction with a review of definitions of and motivations for collegiality. We distinguish between two dimensions of collegiality: horizontal and vertical. To distinguish collegiality from other forms of governance, we analyze ideal types and use them to further explore both what academic collegiality is and how it interplays with or is challenged by other modes of governance. We revisit some of the recurrent waves of reforms of academic systems that have swept the globe over several centuries and show how these have led to changes in both what is to be governed, how, and by whom.

These reviews also show that collegiality is seldom clear and precisely defined. Rather, collegiality is often referred to as the old way of governing – that which is challenged. In this way, collegiality has largely assumed its meaning in opposition to the introduction of new ways of governing. To illustrate this further, in the introduction to the second volume, we ask if there ever was a golden age of collegiality. We continue by addressing limitations and often raised critiques of collegiality. We seek to sort out which limitations are related to collegiality and which limitations are typical parts of organizing, regardless of how it is governed. We conclude with a discussion about how academic collegiality can be maintained, updated, and revised to serve the purpose of independent knowledge inquiry.

In this introductory paper, we also present the thematic comparative perspective that runs through both volumes. We conclude by summarizing the papers in this first volume.

## **VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL COLLEGIALITY**

Collegiality is far from a theoretically specified concept, even if, as we will revisit, important contributions have aimed at specifying its core (e.g., Bennett, 1998; Denis et al., 2019; Lazega, 2020; Tapper & Palfreyman, 2010, 2014; Waters, 1989; Weber, 1922/1978). The word “collegiality” has at least a double connotation. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the noun “collegiality” refers to (a) “colleagueship, the relation between colleagues”; and (b) “the principle of having a collegium.”<sup>1</sup> Whereas the first definition has thesaurus connections such as “society,” “society and the community,” “social relations,” “association, fellowship, or companionship,” and “colleagueship,” the second is related to society

in the meaning of authority, rule, or government, in the sense of a “deliberative, legislative, or administrative assembly,” among others. Further browsing of dictionaries uncovers definitions including “friendly relationships” between people working together (Cambridge Dictionary<sup>2</sup>), “cooperative relationship of colleagues,” and participating in government, as in “participation of bishops in the government of the Roman Catholic Church in collaboration with the Pope” (Merriam Webster Dictionary<sup>3</sup>).

In research on collegiality, we usually find aspects of both meanings. However, we argue for a need to analytically distinguish between the two. Such a conceptual distinction lays the groundwork for seeing how various aspects of collegiality condition and balance each other. Here, we conceptually distinguish between what we term vertical and horizontal collegiality.

Vertical collegiality concerns decision-making structures within a formal organization and a set of rules. Along the vertical dimension, collegial decision-making is organized around faculty authority. It involves university boards, senates, and committees; the selection of *primus/prima inter pares* as academic leaders (Lazega, 2020, p. 10); and rules for the promotion and appointment of professors, resource allocation, recruitment, new curricula, etc., with faculty participation in these decisions.

Horizontal collegiality involves social relations or companionship and encompasses dynamics among communities of peers in departments and universities, reviewers of academic outputs, conference attendees, and scholarly networks. Hence, horizontal collegiality is not confined to university boundaries, as peer relations span such boundaries. Even though dictionaries list “friendly relationships” as a synonym for collegiality, we want to emphasize that this is not what horizontal collegiality is about. During the collaboration that led to these volumes, the friendly sociable aspect of collegiality was sometimes referred to as “tea room” collegiality, as in having a tea with a colleague during a relaxing break. Instead, in horizontal collegiality, the norms of the institution of collegiality as described below are enacted, activated, and reinforced.

Horizontal and vertical collegiality are interdependent. Peers provide reviews, critiques, and advice that inform decisions about tenure and promotion, recruitment, etc. Moreover, peers are mobilized to elect individuals for formal positions in universities, research councils, and other academic bodies. The vertical collegial structure is also based on legitimacy from the horizontal collegium. In other words, vertical and horizontal collegiality presuppose and balance each other. Formal collegial decision-making in universities draws on the existence and activities of the broader scientific<sup>4</sup> community.

### *Definitions of Collegiality*

Before we return to these two aspects of collegiality and how they relate to each other, we review definitions of collegiality found in research on universities. The sociologist Malcolm Waters (1989, p. 956) summarized the collegial principle as:

Collegiate structures are those in which there is dominant orientation to a consensus achieved between the members of a body of experts who are theoretically equal in their levels of expertise but who are specialized by area of expertise.

He elaborated this definition by spelling out six organizational characteristics of collegiality based on works by Weber and Parsons. First, the organizing of collegiality is based on the use and application of theoretical knowledge. This knowledge is specialized, differentiated, complex, non-routinizable, and requires regular maintenance. Authority, then, is based on expertise. Bodies of experts are expected to control and participate in decision-making. Second, “members of collegiate organizations are conceived of as professionals” (Waters, 1989, p. 956). These members are not regulated by contract, self-interest, or outside interests, but by their vocational commitments. They begin their careers as “apprentices” and are socialized into the collegium. A third principle is formal egalitarianism. Because members of the collegium are specialists within performance-based organizations, comparing performances is “frequently difficult” (Waters, 1989, p. 956). Formally, members are equal in the sense that no field of expertise or competence is subordinate to others, yet they are stratified when searching for prestige in terms of attracting resources and talented recruits. A fourth principle is formal autonomy:

Collegiate organizations are self-controlling and self-policing; that is, they are not subject to direction from any external source once they have been constituted. Formal autonomy has two aspects. The first is freedom of action in relation to the pursuit of professional goals. Groups of colleagues are free to do research, to instruct others, and to communicate findings or other forms of knowledge insofar as these things are relevant to professional standing. Collegiate organizations are ideally facilitative rather than authoritarian systems, in which performance standards are established interpersonally and informally rather than by formal rule. (Waters, 1989, p. 958)

Waters (1989, p. 958) termed the fifth principle “scrutiny of product.” Following the self-policing and egalitarian aspects, “there must be maximum stress on peer evaluation and informal control. The products of the work done by colleagues must be available for peer review” (Waters, 1989, p. 958). Peer review includes, for instance, written opinions and oral dissemination, consultation, and second opinions to ensure collegial deliberation. The last principle, “collective decision making” implies that administrative acts and subsequent decisions by collegial bodies are legitimate only when all members participate in the process, and when it has the “full support of the entire collectivity” (Waters, 1989, p. 955). As every member is highly specialized, no individual has complete knowledge about the problem or issue at hand. Hence, consensus must be achieved, or as formulated by Waters (1989, p. 969), “internally egalitarian and consensus governed and specifies individual autonomy for members.” To accomplish this, collegiate organizations often have complex committee systems. When procedures for democratic voting replace consensus, they function as a means for “the protection of minorities in committees” (Waters, 1989, p. 959).

We find related definitions in subsequent studies. In their study of collegiality in universities, Tapper and Palfreyman (2014) listed four core elements, including: (a) the federal structure between different departments and institutions within the university; (b) the notion that academics – as experts – establish policies and the mission of the university; (c) intellectual collegiality, including the task of understanding the purpose of research, both as it is conducted among colleagues

and how it is disseminated to the wider community; and (d) “commensality,” the process of socialization among faculty and students that creates a sense of community and “long-term institutional loyalty” (Tapper & Palfreyman, 2014, p. 28).

Lazega (2020, p. 11) elaborated definitions of collegiality further, and more clearly related them to:

non-routine and innovative work, formal equality among heterogenous members trying to self-govern by reaching agreements in committee work and – in the absence of true hierarchy – using personalized relationships to create various levels of collective responsibility and make this coordination work. Regularities in such relationships build relational infrastructures, and these relational infrastructures are key for peers to manage committee work, helping them prepare, if not make decisions upstream of the formal meetings.

Collegiality has been defined as a behavioral norm (Macfarlane, 2005, 2007) and a sense of community and commensality – that is, being socialized into a particular setting or community so that members share a long-term loyalty to the work conducted and to the community as such (Tapper & Palfreyman, 2010, 2014), or “the glue that holds an academic community together” (Kligyte & Barrie, 2014, p. 161). Such definitions also connect collegiality to professionalism (Waters, 1989) and to “academic citizenship.” Moreover, collegiality builds upon a nurturing leadership that can contribute to a collegial spirit and foster loyalty among academics beyond their local setting to the whole university and the broader academy (Macfarlane, 2007). A few definitions limit collegiality to respectful behavior at work, but in the contexts of university studies and governance studies, such definitions are rare (see, e.g., Seigel, 2004).

Collegiality also has been defined as a characteristic of the work process of academics (Bennett, 1998) supported by norms and values shared among peers (Chatelain-Ponroy et al., 2019). Emphasizing the relationships between scholars even further, Bennett introduced collegiality as a relational model that challenges individuality on behalf of the community. Scholars are not independent from each other. As Bennett (1998) put it, in the academic world, others are means and ends. This requires self-confidence in terms of individual worth, but also explains how relations with others help to reinforce, expand, and sometimes transform this experience of worth. Bennett (1998, p. 24) wrote:

Challenged by insights of others, rather than isolated from them, the individual absorbs and evaluates these perspectives and finds they may enhance his or her own freedom and creativity. Others are no longer just associated, but companions and colleagues ... Sufficiently secure, one is able to provide others with the conditions that enable them to grow in their diversity and uniqueness, even as they provide these conditions for oneself.

As Bennett noted, this requires an understanding of a relational academic community. Irrespective of the size of this community (ranging from a department to a wider research community), this “collegium is the primary context of connectivity and reciprocity among its constituent members” (Bennett, 1998, p. 27). Within this context, newcomers are socialized in line with “commensality” as expressed by Tapper and Palfreyman (2014) and Waters (1989) second principle of professionalism.

A collegial system is built so as not to give all the power to individual persons, but forms a system where individual leaders and their measures are subject to



questioning and testing, much like the work of scholars and research results. This does not mean that academic leaders in a collegial system are expected to be weak. Quite the contrary, leaders are expected to take action based on scientific argumentation and scientific qualifications (Bennett, 1998; Goodall, 2009; Lamont, 2009). It is truly a meritocratic system designed to be independent of individual interests to protect academic freedom. Knowledge should always come before interests.

While several of the definitions above focus on university settings, definitions of collegiality apply to other kinds of work and organizations as well. Weber (1922/1978) foresaw modern applications of collegiality in supreme authorities, agencies, and advisory bodies – that is, in contexts where there is an interest in limiting the power of specific groups and individuals, and a preference for shared power and cooperation across multiple groups without a dominant leader. Lazega (2020), for instance, highlighted how collegial principles can be applied in the construction of new markets (demanding personalized relationships), the executive suite in large bureaucracies (private corporations and public governments) and the Catholic Church. Waters (1989) on the other hand, documented collegial governance in the context of research centers, cultural networks, and human welfare service fields. Other examples include architecture firms, law firms, and parts of the financial market (e.g., arbitrage) (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist, 2016a).

As we continue to elaborate our definition of collegiality, we focus on university settings. The definitions above range from formal structures of universities and their decision-making processes to norms that guide the missions and values of universities as well as interactions and work processes. We end our review of definitions with a quote from Kant (1794, p. 1) that captures many of the above-mentioned aspects:

Whoever it was that first hit on the notion of a university and proposed that a public institution of this kind be established, it was not a bad idea to handle the entire content of learning (really, the thinkers devoted to it) by mass production, so to speak – by a division of labor, so that for every branch of the sciences there would be a public teacher or professor appointed as its trustee, and all of these together would form a kind of learned community called a university (or higher school). The university would have a certain autonomy (since only scholars can pass judgment on scholars as such), and accordingly it would be authorized to perform certain functions through its faculties ... smaller societies, each comprising the university specialists in one main branch of learning): to admit the university students seeking entrance from the lower schools and, having conducted examinations, by its own authority to grant degrees or confer the universally recognized status of “doctor” on free teachers (that is, teachers who are not members of the university) – in other words, to create doctors.

What Kant (1794, p. 1) described is the collegial university: a system of self-governance “to handle the entire content of learning (really, the thinkers devoted to it) by mass production,” with a “certain autonomy” based on the cognitive understanding that “only scholars can pass judgment on scholars.” Kant reminds us that collegiality is a mode of governance that puts faculty members in the driver’s seat – that is, it builds on faculty authority.

### *Collegiality as an Institution*

The definitions above use different words and conceptual framings, but together they paint a comprehensive picture of what collegiality is. Collectively, they show



that collegiality cannot be reduced to a certain organizational structure or specific behaviors. We read the definitions above as pointing to various aspects of collegiality as an institution of self-governance: an institution that includes formal rules and structures for decision-making; normative and cognitive underpinnings of identities and purposes; and specific practices. A definition of collegiality as an institution of self-governance points to the importance of a largely taken-for-granted repetitive practice that is underpinned by and reinforces normative systems and cognitive understandings (Greenwood et al., 2008).

Before we return to horizontal and vertical aspects of collegiality, we elaborate briefly on the institutional perspective in this context. Here, we build on March and Olsen (1995) institutional perspective of governance as constituted by basic practices and rules, individual purposes and intentions, and a common system of meaning, as articulated in their book, *Democratic Governance*:

In an institutional perspective, governance involves creating capable political actors who understand how political institutions work and are able to deal effectively with them (Anderson, 1990, pp. 196–197). It involves building and supporting cultures of rights and rules that make possible the agreements represented in coalition understandings. It involves building and supporting identities, preferences, and resources that make a polity possible. It involves building and supporting a system of meaning and understanding history. (March & Olsen, 1995, p. 28)

This builds on

a view of human action as driven less by anticipation of its uncertain consequences and preferences for them than by a logic of appropriateness reflected in a structure of rules and conception of identities. (March & Olsen, 1995, p. 28).

It also builds on a:

view of governance as extending beyond negotiating coalitions within given constraints and rights, rules, preferences and resources to shaping those constraints, as well as constructing meaningful accounts of politics, history, and self that are not only bases for instrumental action but also central to concerns of life. (March & Olsen, 1995 p. 28)

As an institution, collegiality is thus inhabited both by formal structures and “by people doing things together” (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006). Hallett and Ventresca (2006, p. 213) pointed to the importance of how:

on the one hand, institutions provide the raw materials and guidelines for social interactions (“construct interactions”), and on the other hand, the meanings of institutions are constructed and propelled forward by social interactions. Institutions are not inert categories of meaning; rather they are populated with people whose social interactions suffuse institutions with local force and significance.

Structures for collegial decision-making, in other words, are not sufficient for collegiality to be upheld. Jepperson (1991) emphasized the importance of activities to institutional maintenance and institutional development. Institutions are enacted and reinforced through myriad supporting and reproducing practices. Studies of collegiality then, need to capture structures and rules as well as identities, norms, purposes, and practices. In the sections below, we describe two central meanings and practices of the collegial institution before summarizing vertical and horizontal collegiality from an institutional perspective.

*A System for Knowledge Inquiry*

A central mission of higher education and research is to preserve, advance, and provide knowledge (Bennett, 1998), and to ensure the continuation of knowledge inquiry (Kligyte & Barrie, 2014; Kristensson Ugglå, 2019). The collegial institution is based on this perceived mission with an emphasis that those with knowledge expertise are also those who should be in control – not least as a way of ensuring the advancement of knowledge remains free and independent from being distorted or controlled by external interests.

Knowledge inquiry is never made in isolation, even though much research output is attributed to the efforts of individual scholars and many prizes for scholarly work are given to individuals; likewise, research is at times depicted as solitary work, with individual scholars working undisturbed (Bennett, 1998; Kristensson Ugglå, 2019; Merton, 1942). Yet, scientific work is based on “indebtedness to the common heritage and a recognition of the essentially cooperative and cumulative quality of science” (Merton, 1942, p. 123). For example, Nobel laureates are rewarded for their individual path-breaking contributions to knowledge that benefits the world. In speeches, these laureates regularly thank both their close colleagues and their more distant predecessors, and even competitors (see [www.nobelprize.org/the-nobel-prize-organisation/the-nobel-foundation/](http://www.nobelprize.org/the-nobel-prize-organisation/the-nobel-foundation/)). Stephen Rowland (2008, p. 353) claimed that this intellectual commitment – “a shared love of knowledge” – is among the outcomes distinguishing the collegium from the corporation, and enthusiasm for academic subjects is to be passed on to students.

Ideally, a system for knowledge inquiry includes all tasks required for critical and constructive scrutiny, and for knowledge development. To enable this, a primary commitment among scholars is to learn. That is, knowledge inquiry cannot involve acquiring power, establishing friendships, or pursuing other personal advantages for their own sake, but must always be balanced with scrutiny and checks and balances. It is a community built upon reason and reciprocity (Bennett, 1998), or as pointed out by Meyer and Quattrone (2021, p. 1376) in their call for how to advance collective understanding given unprecedented global and social challenges: “more reciprocal critique within the boundaries of a constructive dialogue rather than ceremonial citation or turf battles.” Guiding the inquiry, learning, and possible knowing is the process of peer review; thus, “claims to knowledge and truth are always to be supported by arguments that embody reasons” (Bennett, 1998, p. 33). As presented by Merton (1942) under the label “communism”: methods and new knowledge are to be scrutinized through peer review, and then made public. This way, scientific knowledge can be improved, but also diffused (Zuckerman & Merton, 1971).

*Academic Citizenship: Between Vertical and Horizontal Collegiality*

In his classic text based on a lecture from 1917, Weber discussed the conditions for an academic career and made some comparisons between the United States and Germany. Despite promoting the bureaucratic “specialist” in texts such as *Economy and Society* (Rhoades, 1990), in other texts Weber described specialists as “cultivated” and as responding to a calling or pursuing a vocation. In a

footnote, he explained what he meant by science as a vocation, or *Wissenschaft als Beruf* in German. *Wissenschaft* includes all academic disciplines, not only the (natural) sciences; *Beruf* would colloquially be translated as “profession” but the root *rufen* refers to “vocation” or “calling” (Weber, 1917/2004, p. 1). Such a calling has been seen as pivotal for scientific work, defined as a means “to fulfill one’s purpose in life such that the work becomes an end in itself” (Lee & Walsh, 2022, p. 1059). This also sets the conditions for what it is to be a scholar, to be member of a faculty.

Among other things, Weber emphasized the dual aspect of the task that lay ahead of scholars, to both conduct scholarly work and to teach. When success was measured by the number of students attracted to a course, “crowd-pleasing” actions were to be expected, thereby risking to set quality aside. Complementing this is the “inner vocation” involving hard work that may lead to “inspiration” and complete devotion to the subject, but also the expectation that knowledge outputs will be advanced and possibly superseded and abandoned by future generations of scholars.

Following Weber’s notion of science as a vocation, we see that academic citizenship is fundamental in academic work. Academic citizenship is central in most definitions of collegiality, including, for instance, “service to students, colleagues, their institution, their discipline or profession, and the public” (Macfarlane, 2007, p. 264). When viewing academic work as a calling, and a scholar as a member of a faculty, tasks such as editorial work, peer reviewing, participating in examination committees, serving as head of a department or dean, etc., are all part of the vocation even if these tasks, in times of increased measurements and numerical control, are not often accounted for as part of ordinary work. Academic citizenship thus translates Merton’s (1942) CUDOS norms – communism, universalism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism – into practice. Furthermore, it can be noted that both vertical and horizontal collegiality require faculty engagement and commitment to be effective (Denis et al., 2019).

Peer review is a core practice of collegiality. As in other forms of academic work, we find a combination and balance of critical scrutiny with a common aim, identity, and understanding. Moreover, peer review systems tend to be partly regulated by written rules and procedures yet also rely on professional assessment and discretion (see, e.g., [www.vr.se/english/applying-for-funding/how-applications-are-assessed.html#Eightprinciplestosafeguardquality](http://www.vr.se/english/applying-for-funding/how-applications-are-assessed.html#Eightprinciplestosafeguardquality)).

The peer review system was used by medical journals as early as 1731 (Medical Essays and Observations, published by the Royal Society of Edinburgh) (Lund Dean & Forray, 2018), and then introduced as a more general process for academic publications in the late eighteenth century, aiming to provide authentication, foster public confidence, and confer legitimacy to published manuscripts (Brewis, 2018; Zuckerman & Merton, 1971). Among scholars, peer reviews are seen as a service to the community for the public good, as part of the collegial commitment, and as a component of the free, unpaid, and often unnoticed labor of academia (Brewis, 2018). It is a task of academic citizenship. Such a process is not necessarily harmonious, and is likely to involve tense debates and disagreements in the search for the best arguments to support the creation of new knowledge (Kligyte & Barrie, 2014). When new evidence is found, arguments

are corrected. In short, peer review should be based on the Mertonian norm of organized skepticism (Merton, 1942). As noted by Ludwik Fleck in 1935, during such a process a new, albeit temporary, consensus is established (Harwood, 1986).

In more recent work, scholars have discussed the vulnerabilities of the peer review system. For instance, Lund Dean and Forray (2018) noted that authors decline to take on reviewing assignments, even when they have submitted manuscripts for possible publication in the same journal (in this case the top-tier *Journal of Management Education*). They concluded that because peer review is not a formal working task, a central part of the academic citizenship expected from scholars risks being deprioritized. Indeed, journals frequently encounter difficulties finding scholars to conduct peer reviews, and in a system with high competition not only among scholars, but also among publications, many journals take shortcuts and try to find less time-consuming ways to subject work to scrutiny.

### *The Vulnerability of Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions of Collegiality*

Drawing on our review of definitions of collegiality, and on the distinct nature and interdependence of vertical and horizontal collegiality, we summarize the section on collegiality as an institution of self-governance with a few remarks on its vulnerability in the contemporary university landscape. We have emphasized that as collegiality forms an inhabited institution of academic work, the conduct of individual faculty – academic researchers and teachers – is shaped by collective norms upheld in practice by the collective of academics. It is a meritocratic system in which leaders and decision-makers represent science and the scholarly community. Collegial organizing ideally includes an organizational structure with leaders who have the support and confidence of their colleagues and are elected by them (i.e., the principle of *primus inter pares*). Academic leadership is viewed as an act of service to the community (Lazega, 2020; Waters, 1989). Collegiality presupposes and builds on relations among scholars as a form of self-governance in the pursuit of knowledge advancement. To accomplish this, independence from the undue influence of external interests is yet another fundamental priority. Such governing structures may be found to a smaller or larger extent throughout systems of higher education and research, for example, in universities and research institutes, research funding bodies, and national and transnational policy units.

Moreover, we have pointed to the interplay of vertical and horizontal collegiality. Vertical collegiality comprises rules, regulations, and organizational bodies that prescribe the control and participation of faculty in decision-making. This decision-making also needs to be supported with horizontal collegiality, as peers are mobilized for reviews, scrutiny, advice, and support.

When defining collegiality in these ways, it also becomes clear that challenges to collegiality have grounds in revised governance, which can be driven by politics, as well as shifting organizational ideals and changing cultures and identities within universities. Challenges can also stem from views of scientific work in broader society and among scholars. We have already briefly touched upon some of these challenges, but revisit them below.

Many studies on changes in and threats to universities concern challenges to and the possible undermining of vertical collegiality. Formal collegial bodies such

as senates and faculty boards have been restructured or eliminated according to enterprise and bureaucratic ideals. Administrators have taken on more strategic roles. Along similar lines, strategic management personnel increasingly control the recruitment of leaders and academic staff, educational programs, assessment criteria, etc., rather than faculty. Decisions have been centralized and increasingly are imposed from the top-down. These developments have followed the erosion of faculty authority and exacerbated it. Developments follow similar trends in most places, with some variation. A complete breakdown of vertical collegiality can occur if university decision-making is placed exclusively in the hands of strategic managers, and administrators and faculty (teachers and researchers) become subordinated employees.

Challenges to horizontal collegiality have not been subject to as much research. From the discussion above, however, we can conclude that horizontal collegiality may also be undermined as additional layers of administration and enterprise ideals are introduced into the system. This development may lead to a more instrumentalized view of knowledge with less appreciation for the facts that science and collegiality may take time and horizontal collegiality may not be easily measured. Perhaps even greater threats to collegiality include the potential for scholars to stop seeing (a) knowledge as a common or public good (see [Calhoun, 2006](#)); (b) each other as colleagues in the face of intensifying competition; (c) value in participating in collectives of scientists; or (d) each other or scholarly work as trustworthy.

## MIXED MODES OF GOVERNANCE

In the introduction to this article, we characterized universities and systems of higher education and research as places where various modes of governance intersect, and where the many tasks and missions that higher education and research are expected to be fulfilled. This characteristic is captured by the concept of the multiversity ([Kerr, 1963](#); see also [Krücken et al., 2007](#)). Mixed modes of governance also follow from reforms based on widely held ideals of governance and organization (see [Olsen, 2007](#)).

### *Reforms Challenging Collegiality*

Over several centuries, waves of reforms of academic systems have swept the world. These reforms have been driven by new roles applied to universities, expanded systems of higher education and research, as well as shortcomings in existing governance and new ideals for what constitutes appropriate and effective governance. Recently, higher education and research systems have been experiencing a profound wave of reforms punctuated by enterprise ideas ([Barnes, 2020](#); [Czarniawska, 2019](#); [Hüther & Krücken, 2016, 2018](#); [Marginson, 2006](#); [Marginson & Considine, 2000](#); [Musselin, 2018](#); [Ramirez, 2010](#); [Rowlands, 2015](#); [Tapper & Palfreyman, 2010](#); [Wedlin & Pallas, 2017](#)). Management positions have expanded with a stronger emphasis on hierarchy, more well-defined boundaries between universities as organizational actors and their environments, and more rigorous

performance measurements at the organization level (Krücken & Meier, 2006; Meyer & Bromley, 2013; Musselin, 2018; Ramirez, 2010). As a result, the control and governance mechanisms of many universities are now modeled after other kinds of organizations; hence, from a governance perspective, universities have come to be seen as less unique.

Reforms tend to be tied to changes in the missions, tasks, and roles of research and higher education (Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson, 2000; Collini, 2012; Oliver-Luneman & Drori, 2021). Even when this is not the case, it is clear that changed governance has both been driven by and exacerbated the erosion of faculty authority (Fleming, 2020; Rowlands, 2015). Changes in university governance are sometimes described as a shift from collegiality to enterprise management (Marginson, 2006; Marginson & Considine, 2000; Rowlands, 2015). Discussing the US context, Tuchman (2009) analyzed the development of corporate universities, with, for instance, an expanded focus on branding work. In the UK, the development of the “McUniversity” is one such example (Parker & Jary, 1995), and in Finland, enterprise ideals in academia have been discussed in relation to how the introduction of performance measurement systems (PMS) threatens to disrupt the very ethos of academic work (Kallio et al., 2016). Reporting from a research project on management practices in Australian higher education, Marginson (2000) found that outside forces pressured universities to change their governance structures, and subsequently, their academic traditions. These impinging forces included “government programs and funding systems, mass student participation, industry involvement, and global markets” (Marginson, 2000, p. 29). With the introduction of business norms and enterprise-like modes of management and control, universities became “less sure of themselves” (Marginson, 2000, p. 31). Interviews with university leaders about this process also showed how collegial ideals and practices had limited resistance to enterprise models. Marginson wrote (2000, p. 31):

Over and over again it became apparent that those in positions of greatest influence in the universities were often fixated on simplistic outside norms of good management. There was a loss of the sense of the distinctive character of universities, a forgetting of what it is that they do, and what makes them different to other institutions, and an undue faith in generic organizational models. There is more here than just benchmarking for excellence. Being useful to business is interpreted as being like business.

Governance practice of today’s higher education and research is partly a result of a shift in governance ideals, but it is also characterized by a mix of models accompanied by plural and partly contradictory missions, ideals, and identities (Cloete et al., 2015; Krücken et al., 2007; Sahlin, 2012). Collegial forms of governing, where faculty play the main role, are retained to different extents. This raises questions about the importance and quality of collegiality, how collegiality is combined with other modes of governance and the relationship between collegial governance and the roles of research and higher education in society.

### *Three Ideal Types of Governance: Enterprise, Bureaucracy and Collegiality*

Weber’s (1922/1978) ideal types can be used to flesh out the central aspects of governance forms to enable an analysis and comparison of changes in and



combinations of contemporary modes of governance employed in university contexts (also see for instance [Lazega, 2020](#); [Parker & Jary, 1995](#); [Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist, 2016a, 2016b](#)). The ideal types discussed here are enterprise, bureaucracy, and collegial governance.

First, a caution on ideal types: Models of organizational governance are often discussed in ideal terms, as perfect scripts for how to run operations. Calling such scripts ideal types, Weber saw them as conceptual tools to be used for a specific purpose. Over time, these Weberian types have been much debated – for instance, whether they should be seen as substantive conclusions or as methodological tools ([Udy, 1959](#)) – but they have also been seen as “overly abstract and general, better suited to classification than explanation” ([Rosenberg, 2016](#), p. 85). There is no doubt, however, that if the ideal types are part of a theoretical scheme that is applied to a practical context, they also can serve as a tool for explaining what actually happens ([Olsen, 2014](#)).

Possibly the best-known organizational ideal type is [Weber’s \(1922/1978\)](#) ideal concerning bureaucracy. According to the bureaucratic ideal, roles and routines are in focus and positions are filled with individuals who fulfill their regulated tasks. Orders are hierarchical, roles are distinguished between leaders and subordinates, and staff members are thoroughly trained for specialized work within their areas of education and expertise. As Weber emphasized, as an ideal, bureaucracy is the most efficient way to run a government according to rational standards. A core part is also that all co-workers identify with the rationale – that is, they internalize and uphold the culture of bureaucracy ([Weber, 1922/1978](#)).

As stated above, less recognized is that Weber also discussed collegiality as an ideal type for organizational governance, primarily as a method to create a hierarchy that can both control experts and limit the control of monocratic or autocratic leaders (see also [Lazega, 2020](#); [Waters, 1989](#)). Collegiality is then described as self-governance among peers who use their own formal structures and rely on collective responsibility as a management tool ([Lazega, 2020](#)). Whereas bureaucracy includes rules and routines, collegiality becomes an ideal type for work run by bodies of deliberation that come to include work that is non-routine and innovative ([Lazega, 2020](#)).

As much of Weber’s work was aimed at promoting bureaucracy ([Kaube, 2019](#)), which was well-suited to prospering mass production at the time, this also led to a disregard of the full-fledged theory of collegiality as a way to explain collective action, as [Lazega \(2020\)](#) pointed out. [Waters \(1989, p. 945\)](#) explained that this was because Weber did not integrate the “collegial social structural arrangements created by professional groups.” Instead, by analyzing collegiality as an organizing principle “almost entirely in negative terms,” Weber anticipated that collegiality would retreat and be supplanted by bureaucratization. The latter, enabling both “rapid decision making and efficient administration” ([Waters, 1989, p. 946](#)), would be beneficial for the political sphere and for public agencies, as a start.

The enterprise ideal assumes a hierarchy based on charismatic leadership ([Fleming, 2020](#); [Weber, 1922/1978](#)). An organization is perceived to acquire a unique identity as an actor, not as a member of a community, collective, or a platform for professional groups ([Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson, 2000](#); [Krücken & Meier, 2006](#);



Meyer & Bromley, 2013; Ramirez, 2010). Organizational boundaries are therefore important (Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson, 2000). A manager in the enterprise/paternalistic system stands the risk of seeing oneself as more important than colleagues; that is, colleagues are no longer equals, but subordinates to the power-holder (Fleming, 2020).

Ideal types and theoretical concepts form frames of reference, not only for scholarly analysis, but also for developing practice (Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson, 2000, pp. 721–722):

The abstract and general concepts of theorists have a considerable practical impact. Theoretical concepts are based on the study of the actions, descriptions and interpretation of practitioners. Once formulated they are often reintroduced later into the world of practice. There they are compared with current practices and used to determine what is good or bad, what is lacking and needs to be done. Concepts traveling back and forth in this way, between theory and practice, are a common feature of late modernity (Giddens, 1990). Theoretical concepts are used for developing practice as well as theory.

With this insight in mind, we find that the introduction of enterprise ideals into university settings has largely perverted the ideals of bureaucracy and collegiality, both in practice and in driving organizational development. Bureaucracy and collegiality both have given space to enterprise, and in this process, have become less distinct as modes of governance.

To sum up, in our reading of the literature, the three ideal types help us distinguish between different modes of governance. When comparing the three ideal types, we can distinguish between different ways of coordinating and leading operations, different purposes for organizing, and how an organization is constructed in relation to the operations to be governed. Bureaucracy and enterprise are both hierarchical forms of coordinating. The bureaucracy is coordinated with rules. Staff members are specialized to perform regulated tasks. The leader supervises and ensures that rules are followed. The organization is an instrument or agent working on behalf of others. In Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson (2000, p. 732) words:

Companies can be seen as instruments of their owners, subsidiaries as instruments for their parent companies, departments as instruments for head-office, or public services as instruments for the politicians. Entities of this instrumental kind, working on behalf of others, can be described as agents: they act as agents for their principals.

Enterprise leadership is charismatic, operations aim for targets and they are coordinated with strategies. The organization thus operates as an actor.

Using the same distinguishing aspects, in the collegial ideal type, operations are coordinated by the community, and led by a *primus inter pares* who is held accountable to the collegium. The community, or collegium, is composed of highly specialized experts and different types of expertise are seen as complementary and formally equal. Taken together, the collegial ideal for organizing differs from bureaucratic and enterprise ideals. Instead of rules and routines being set by the manager, the ideal is self-governance, including all members. This means that decisions are to be made in consensus.

In the next section, we reflect upon reforms of universities, and challenges to collegiality by adopting the lenses of these ideal types.

*Enterprise and Bureaucracy*

A quick look at universities through the lenses of the three ideal types – bureaucracy, enterprise, and collegiality – reveals growth in bureaucracy, later combined with the enterprise ideal, largely at the expense of collegiality. We can observe an expansion of managers and enterprise ideals, and with this, an increased focus on strategic planning, policies, formulated mission statements, and developed performance measures, not least at the organization level. A number of reforms along those lines have already been mentioned above and we will return to studies of such reforms below. However, before turning to that discussion we want to stress that challenges to academic collegiality are not a recent development. Moreover, these challenges arise not only in response to external pressures and externally initiated reforms, but also from changes in the practicing of science. In *Science as a Vocation*, Weber (1917/2004) anticipated the transition of science from a calling to work structured by the conditions of bureaucratization. These conditions were applied in the first half of the 1900s, for instance in large science departments in Germany focused on medicine and natural sciences, as well as in universities in the United States (Lee & Walsh, 2022).

Exploring the change from basic science as an independent enterprise conducted as a craft by “freely collaborating professionals or of teachers and their students and unskilled technicians” to larger research teams, Hagstrom (1964, p. 243) anticipated a number of trends that now are part of daily life at universities. Hagstrom noted that research teams with more scientists would be more likely to be centralized and run by administrators who would advocate for a focus on budgets over scientific results, and require support from society rather than the scientific community. He explained that if such teams were managed by industries, they would valorize maintaining the secrecy of research results, rather than sharing them according to the Mertonian ideals of “scientific communism” (Merton, 1942). While it is possible to construct teams to avoid competition and confirm the evaluation of the problem at hand, such collaborations can also be established to build upon different specialized skills. However, doing so creates a new situation for research – namely, the division of labor (Hagstrom, 1964).

More recently, Walsh and Lee (2015) reported how bureaucratic structures have come to be employed by large research groups with “greater division of labor, more standardization, and more hierarchy” (Lee & Walsh, 2022, p. 1069), whereas “traditionally, university labs or research teams have the dual function of producing science and producing scientists who are fully trained to become future PIs” (Lee & Walsh, 2022, p. 1062). As a consequence of increasing bureaucratization, the ratio of supporting scientists is increasing; it is becoming more attractive to employ postdocs than PhD students who require support and training. This is leading to deskilling, as fewer students are being developed into fully integrated scientists; it is also leading to marginalization (Lee & Walsh, 2022). Similar developments have been reported by Gerdin and Englund (2022), who found that PMS enable new ways of governing academic work; even if they express appreciation for top researchers publishing in top-tier journals, such systems risk homogenizing scholarship and restricting academic autonomy and freedom. PMS standardizes an ideal for academic performance in terms of the “most efficient input/output

ratios,” thereby replacing the traditional values of academic work. The present development of increased specialization and a “cadre of supporting scientists” (Lee & Walsh, 2022) is reinforced by competition for funding and the introduction of new ways to demand and measure productivity (Chatelain-Ponroy et al., 2019; Lee & Walsh, 2022).

Much discussed and studied are the NPM university reforms, with an imitation of organization models from private enterprises. Consequently, the models of control and governance of universities have been elaborated based on the model used by corporations (Dearlove, 1995; Marginson & Considine, 2000; Rhodes, 2017; Tuchman, 2009). As part of this, PMS organized around the quantification of perceived research value serve as a foundation for the resource allocation system (Aguinis et al., 2020). Within the enterprise governing model, management positions have expanded with an emphasis on more hierarchical forms of management (Rhodes, 2017), strengthened boundaries between the university as an organization and its environment, and performance measurement at the organization level (Aguinis et al., 2020; Hüther & Krücken, 2018; Krücken & Meier, 2006).

Organizational performance, measured as outputs and/or key performance indicators is crucial, as the enterprise university is seen as a producing entity operating in a market, in competition with other organizations (Fleming, 2020). As Fleming (2020, p. 1306) put it, “Universities now adopt a corporate ethos, with business schools exemplifying the trend, including all-glass faces and dark business attire.” In this situation, students become customers, pushing for satisfaction and value for money (Tuchman, 2009).

The prevalent practice of counting A-journal publications is one example of a PMS. Instead of rewarding new knowledge and research content – that is, applied methods, collected field material, findings, and consequences for theory and practice – the focus has shifted to “playing the game” of publishing in A-journals (Aguinis et al., 2020; Butler & Spoelstra, 2012; Fleming, 2020). As concluded by Rhodes (2017), “metrification” drives researchers to ask the question, “What should I study and present in order to get the legitimate credits from the REF/RAE<sup>5</sup> audit?” Attempts to publish in A-journals resemble sports competitions. One “wins” the game and earns respect by successfully publishing articles in A-journals, which replace peer assessment by functioning “as a proxy for evaluating the quality of the research output” (Aguinis et al., 2020, p. 137).

As an illustration of the different ideal types, Kristensson Ugglå (2019) discussed how the economization of contemporary universities also leads to a mix and subsequent conflict between different systems of competition. Even if markets and scientific development are both based on competition, the underlying rationales and goals of these systems are different. Market competition aims to increase efficiency, but also to confer legitimacy and provide processes for checks and balances. Within science – and the collegial ideal – neither competitors nor winners are the main focus. Instead, the focus is on vetting ideas and making contributions to knowledge development that will sustain over time.

The discussion above suggests that modes of governance tend to be translated into practice in relation to each other, and with such translations, certain modes

may be seen as subordinate to others. Sahlin and Eriksson-Zetterquist (2016a, 2016b) found islands of collegiality in a university system otherwise characterized by bureaucratic and enterprise modes of governance. Similarly, Lazega (2020, p. 9) found “collegial pockets” in larger bureaucratic organizations. Governance modes may be mixed because one form of governance is challenged by another that is seen as better or more appropriate; however, various modes of governance also may support and complement each other. Bureaucracy and collegiality have become complementary modes of governance in universities, public sector organizations, and professional organizations more generally. Lazega (2020) argued that such a combination allows for both rule-following (bureaucracy) and innovation (collegiality).

The ways in which modes of governance connect and interplay depend largely on how these modes are understood in practice (Chatelain-Ponroy et al., 2019). For example, even with formal structures reflecting the diverse ideal types of governance described above, individual leaders tend to operate – and link and blend – diverse modes of governance. In this way, faculty members, as well as individual leaders and decision-makers at all levels are interlocutors between their colleagues and between diverse modes of governance. Even when leaders are elected in collegial processes, they cannot be assumed to automatically see their work as a service to their community; equally possible is a scenario where academic leaders align with management and adopt more enterprise approaches to governance. The positions leaders and faculty take in this liminal governance space at different levels have clear consequences for the space and structure of collegiality and how it connects with other modes of governance.

#### *Democracy or Consensus*

Several decision-making and advisory bodies of universities are both seen as collegial and democratic bodies, and these forms of governance are sometimes both mixed and confused (Olsen, 2007). While in Sweden we have seen that academic democracy has partly been strengthened at the expense of collegiality (Ahlbäck Öberg & Boberg, 2023), in other settings “academic democracy” has been weakened and marginalized together with a weakened collegiality. In Australia, it has been reported how the development of more enterprise and bureaucratic forms of governance eroded the foundations of democracy (Rowlands, 2015), but also how democratization and bureaucratization, when applied simultaneously within universities, operate in conflict with each other (Barnes, 2020). Even if sometimes assumed to be an issue of democratic voting procedures, collegiality is politically different from democracy. Furthermore, even if academic democracy may sound appealing, collegiality avoids such decision-making by drawing on consensus. We also note that neither bureaucracy nor paternalistic enterprise forms of governance include democratic decision-making. As Weber (1924/1978, p. 362) contended:

There is absolutely nothing “democratic” about collegiality. When the privileged classes had to guard themselves against the threat of those who were negatively privileged, they were always obliged to avoid, in this way [i.e. via collegiality], allowing any monocratic, seigniorial power that might count on those strata to arise.

Lazega (2020, p. 13) explained this based on his reading of Weber:

Thus, Weber understands the social and political world as an organizational space. In his view of collegiality, he considers it an attempt to guarantee respect of deontological rules, but not in a social vacuum – that is, inside bureaucratized settings where hierarchy, power differentials and domination represent a micropolitical reality with which deliberative bodies must contend.

Lazega (2020, p. 14) also described the collegial work to achieve consensus as:

attempts to focus and “harmonize” different points of view, to make them converge towards a single perspective thanks to debate and discussion, provided consensus is not idealized as adhesion but defined as an initial and temporary fiction serving as basis for cooperation ... remaining challengeable and revisable.

In this search process of building consensus, a collective basis for decision-making will be established, as the process brings together a great variety of competencies, experiences, and judgments. A core in knowledge inquiry as enabled by universities, is to apply different and opposing perspectives, and to use the collegial process with openness for participants to critique and question each other with the aim of surfacing the best ideas and continuing the conversation.

#### *Mixed Modes: Tensions, Tradeoffs, and Complementarities*

Comparisons across countries and across universities reveal that governance modes mix differently in different settings. Collegiality, as an old and largely taken-for-granted mode of governance, has developed differently across settings. Enterprise and bureaucracy models also translate differently across settings. Comparisons show more clearly both how those mixes form and with what impacts, both for collegiality as a mode of governance and for the role and operations of higher education and research.

To develop our understanding of how diverse modes of governance mix, we have followed Weber’s suggestion and gone beyond ideal types, partly in response to contemporary scholarly conversations about how to best understand the plurality of institutions, or what is often referred to as institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011; Thornton et al., 2012). While much of this literature initially emphasized the competing nature of logics, many scholars such as Quattrone (2015, p. 411) began to question

a key assumption in the organizations literature that the dynamism of institutional logics and practice variations is the result of rivalry among logics and actors, of tensions and institutional shifts, and of the agency of institutional entrepreneurs.

As Lounsbury et al. (2021) argued, we need to appreciate the complex ways in which logics interrelate, and to study logics as phenomena in their own right. Thus, we should be open to changes and dynamics following struggles and translations of practical arrangements and procedures of each governance mode. The ways in which governance ideals translate into practice and how governance modes mix are highly dependent on how various modes of governance are understood. To capture this, articles in these volumes report on reforms that challenge and transform collegiality around the world. In addition, they analyze reform histories and they show how collegiality is understood in practice and in relation to other modes of governance.

Studies of developments worldwide point to similarities and global waves of reform. At the same time, it is clear that ideas and ideals are translated differently, and reforms are mixed and integrated with existing systems in various ways. To study the drivers and impacts of such global themes with local variation (Drori et al., 2014), comparisons must be contextualized. This leads us to develop thematic comparisons based on articles that have documented similar and diverse developments around the world.

## THEMATIC COMPARISONS IN TWO VOLUMES

Henrik Björck (2013) has suggested that collegiality should be viewed as an “essentially contested concept” (Connolly, 1974/1993; Gallie, 1956). Like other concepts often characterized as essentially contested, such as democracy or social justice, definitions of collegiality tend always to be value-laden. While many seem to agree on the meanings of such concepts on an abstract and generalized level, those same concepts are subject to contestation, and disagreements surface when it comes to their translation in practice. Moreover, as a contested concept, collegiality is largely defined and discussed in contrast to other modes of working and modes of governing. In this way, collegiality is always contextualized and formed in time and place. Björck (2013) noted that collegiality is becoming more frequently used and more clearly expressed when procedures that have largely been taken for granted and institutionalized are challenged by new forms of organization, control, and governance.

Thus, we can expect to find different considerations, challenges, and practices in the name of collegiality, depending on the situation and context. The papers in this volume point to differences in challenges, as well as understandings, procedures, contexts, and governance mixes. Contributors develop notions and understandings of collegiality; describe and analyze how collegiality is translated and practiced in different settings around the world; and provide insights into procedures that result from encounters between diverse modes of governing. We ask: What are the roles of scholars and academic knowledge in the governance of higher education and research, and how do these reflect and influence the aims and roles of research and higher education? We also direct attention to what collegiality does and examine how collegiality changes with the field of higher education.

## SUMMARY OF PAPERS IN VOLUME 86

### *Collegiality and the Rise of Organizational Actors*

Anna Kosmützky and Georg Krücken analyze a recent transformation of university governance. Their study concerns the highly prestigious research clusters funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). These funding schemes have profoundly changed patterns of academic cooperation and competition. Universities and individual scholars participate in this competition to acquire ample resources for research and bolster their respective scientific reputations.

Self-organizing has been replaced with contractualization and large-scale cooperative research. Ultimately, the authors anticipate a further weakening of collegial bonds, not only because universities and the state have become more active in shaping the nature of academic competition and cooperation, but also because of the increasingly strategic and individualistic orientation of academic researchers.

Lisa-Maria Gerhardt, Jan Goldenstein, Simon Oertel, Philipp Poschmann, and Peter Walgenbach focus on changes in job advertisements for professorships in Germany from 1990 to 2010. This is a period when higher education institutions underwent a transformation from loosely coupled systems to more centrally managed organizations. Central to this ongoing development is the increasing competition for resources and reputation, driving higher education institutions to rationalize their structures and practices. Findings show that the requirements stipulated by universities for professorial positions have become increasingly differentiated (and measurable) over time. In this context, competitive aspects, such as third-party funding, international orientation, or publications, have particularly come to the fore and grown significantly in importance. The authors discuss these findings in light of an increasing managerialization of universities, which has a direct effect on collegiality. They argue that the differentiation of professorial job profiles leads to even more formalized appointment processes and may push collegial governance into the background.

Seungah Lee and Francisco Ramirez study the extent to which universities across the world have become organizational actors. Utilizing an original dataset of a sample of 500 globally oriented universities worldwide, the authors find that these universities have created international, development, and legal offices. Their findings show how these indicators of “getting organized” reflect formalization among universities worldwide, but with clear regional differences. They further suggest that the expansion of organizational actorhood in universities would influence both horizontal and vertical collegiality. For example, the rise of diversity offices and greater pressures to recruit more diverse faculty could lead such offices and senior diversity officers to influence faculty recruitment and hiring decisions. State-engineered resistance to these offices and to the curriculum may undercut faculty governance norms, as well as shared norms of conduct and academic freedom more broadly. Likewise, increased internationalization and the rise of international offices that promote international collaborations could encourage horizontal collegiality that transcends borders. More broadly, the theoretical question is whether becoming an organizational actor leads universities to concentrate on horizontal rather than vertical collegiality.

In the present discourse of university politics, collegiality has come to be viewed as a slow force that is seemingly inefficient and conservative compared to popular management models. Concerns have thus been raised regarding the future prospects of such a form of governance in a society marked by haste and acceleration. One way to put this contentious issue into perspective is to consider it in the light of the long history of the university. Hampus Östh Gustafsson, a historian of science, derives insights about the shifting state of collegial governance through a survey of an intense period of reforms in Sweden c. 1850–1920 when higher education was allegedly engaged in a process of modernization and



professionalization. The analysis is structured around three focal issues for which collegial ideals and practices, including their temporal characteristics, were particularly questioned: (a) the composition of the university board; (b) the employment status of professors; and (c) hiring or promotion practices. Pointing at more structural challenges, this study highlights how collegiality requires constant maintenance paired with an awareness of its longer and complex history.

While the university as an institution is a great success story, concerns are repeatedly expressed of the crises in higher education usually associated with the organizational transformation of universities. Regardless of one's normative assessment of these observations, the institutional success of the university has been accompanied by the emergence of universities as organizational actors. Hokyung Hwang reflects on how these changes could alter the university as an institution, using the Australian higher education sector as an example. Hwang explores how universities as organizational actors, in responding to the demands of its external environment, set in motion a series of changes that redefine highly institutionalized categories within the university and, in doing so, radically remake the university as an institution.

### *Collegiality in a Political Context*

Relations in university settings are becoming more heterogeneous in terms of race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, class, and gender. In South Africa, transformation imperatives have radically changed the complexion of the country's university campuses while entrenching political imperatives. As a consequence, universities have become highly politicized spaces. This is not new. What is new is a communication environment characterized by real-time, global, networked digital communication, and the uptake of digital media platforms (including social media). Francois van Schalkwyk and Nico Cloete explore the effects of politicization and new modes of communication using the case of a controversial article published in a South African journal and the ensuing polemic. They conclude that the highly personal nature of communication that is propelled by digital communication has a direct impact on collegial relations within the university.

Wen Wen and Simon Marginson reflect on university governance, academic culture, and collegial relations in the People's Republic of China. The authors discuss those elements that are distinctive to China and their historical roots (scholarly, Imperial, 20th century Republican, post-1949) as well the similarities between universities in China and in the Euro-American world. The paper explores aspects such as the transformations engendered by system building and World-Class University construction at scale, relations between universities and government, the dual leadership structure, and the explosive growth in China of research publishing and collaboration.

Comparing development in Chile, Colombia, Germany, and the USA, Pedro Pineda explores the increase in temporary academic positions. Globally, the university sector has grown rapidly since the 1950s. With this development, Pineda shows, the share of temporary positions has increased exponentially in Colombia and Germany, whereas the number has stayed relatively stable in the USA since 1980 but has increased since 2012. In Chile, the number of temporary positions

has decreased since 2012. The insecurity of temporary positions has implications for collegiality. Temporary staff are largely excluded from vertical collegial processes and their participation in horizontal collegiality appears unstable as well.

## NOTES

1. Retrieved May 9, 2022, from <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/36304?redirectedFrom=collegiality#eid>.
2. Retrieved May 9, 2022, from <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/collegiality>.
3. Retrieved May 9, 2022, from <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/collegiality>.
4. In this text, “science” is used in the broader sense of the term, which includes the humanities and social sciences as well as natural sciences and medicine, as in the German term *Wissenschaft*.
5. The UK system for evaluation of excellence of research (Research of Excellence Framework, previously Research Assessment Exercise).

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