Corporate payouts in dual classes

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to examine the dividend payments and share repurchases of dual-class firms that have both their superior voting shares and inferior voting shares publicly traded.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper uses matched dual-class and single-class samples from 1994 to 2015 and logit models to evaluate the likelihoods of dividend payment and share repurchase between dual-class firms and single-class firms.

Findings

The results show that dual-class firms are more likely than the matched sample of single-class firms to pay dividends in both share classes. Dual-class firms, however, are more likely to repurchase their superior shares than single-class firms and their inferior shares.

Research limitations/implications

The results suggest that dual-class firms do not use corporate payouts to either mitigate agency problems or maintain the private benefits of control. Instead, dual-class firms use dividend payments to mitigate agency problems while using repurchases of superior shares to maintain the private benefits of control, which supports the agency payout hypothesis.

Practical implications

This paper highlights the differences between dividend payments and share repurchases as forms of corporate payouts and suggests that firms may choose a particular form for a particular purpose.

Originality/value

This paper provides the first piece of empirical evidence on the corporate payouts of dual-class firms separating their superior voting shares and inferior voting shares.

Citation

Lei, A.Y.C., Li, H. and Yu, J. (2019), "Corporate payouts in dual classes", Managerial Finance, Vol. 45 No. 12, pp. 1542-1562. https://doi.org/10.1108/MF-12-2018-0611