Sustainability risk management in a cooperative environment under uncertainty: Iran’s Niayesh tunnel case study

Abstract

Purpose

This study considers a project scheduling model to assess the project risks and the impacts on project sustainability when subcontractors collaborate under uncertainty. Moreover, some allocation methods are applied for fair allocating utility of the project and supper-additivity, stability and satisfaction level of each coalition. Finally, sustainability concept is considered in risk assessment in all coalitions.

Design/methodology/approach

The proposed mathematical programming model evaluates project risks when the subcontractors cooperate with each other by sharing their limited resources. Then, some cooperative game theory methods are applied for fair allocation of net present value, of the cooperation and finally sustainability aspects (economic, social and environmental) are investigated in risk assessment for each possible coalition.

Finding

The results of the proposed model indicate that the subcontractors can increase their profit by 10 per cent ($14,028,450 thousand) and save the equilibrium between sustainability aspects especially in grand coalition. It means that subcontractors do not have incentive to leave the coalition and the supper-additive property is feasible. Furthermore, risk assessment shows that project risks have less impact on subcontractor profits when they cooperate with each other.

Originality/value

Sustainability aspects may be investigated in project management in previous studies, but the authors study sustainability indicators when subcontractors form a coalition and share their resources in response to the risks of availability to resources and delay in completing the project under uncertainty.

Citation

Moradi, M., Hafezalkotob, A. and Ghezavati, V. (2019), "Sustainability risk management in a cooperative environment under uncertainty: Iran’s Niayesh tunnel case study", Kybernetes, Vol. 48 No. 3, pp. 385-406. https://doi.org/10.1108/K-02-2018-0094