Chief executive officer retirement and auditor’s risk assessment: The interacting effect of chief executive officer identity in family firms
Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting
ISSN: 1985-2517
Article publication date: 3 April 2020
Issue publication date: 2 June 2020
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to examine the unique nature of family firms by investigating the moderating effect of chief executive officer (CEO) identity on CEO career horizon and the auditor’s client risk assessment. Consistent with literature on family businesses, the level of CEO attachment to socio-emotional wealth (SEW) varies among family businesses.
Design/methodology/approach
This study used a longitudinal sample of 2,063 non-financial family firm-year observations from 2005 to 2016 listed on the Bursa Malaysia. The study used the general method of moments (GMM), which controls for endogeneity concerns.
Findings
The results reveal that, without the moderating effect of CEO identity, the relationship between CEO career horizon and auditor’s risk assessment is positive, which suggests that the auditor’s risk perception of retiring CEOs is very high. However, the interaction of CEO identity reverses the relationship as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient on the interacted terms. The finding suggests that the auditor’s perceived risk associated with CEO career horizon is lower in family firms with CEOs affiliated to family members or in which the CEO has an equity stake. Overall, the findings provide compelling evidence that the extent of the CEO’s attachment to the firm’s SEW affects the auditor’s client risk assessment.
Practical implications
The findings of the study serve as an enlightenment to policymakers such as Bursa Malaysia and Security Commission that within the family-controlled firms, differences still exist; therefore, there might be a need for future regulatory initiative to cater for the specific need of family-controlled firms.
Originality/value
The study contributes to prior literature by departing from the agency theory adopted in previous studies on auditor choice in family firms under the assumption that family firms are homogenous.
Keywords
Citation
Abdulmalik, S.O., Amran, N.A. and Che-Ahmad, A. (2020), "Chief executive officer retirement and auditor’s risk assessment: The interacting effect of chief executive officer identity in family firms", Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 343-361. https://doi.org/10.1108/JFRA-04-2019-0052
Publisher
:Emerald Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2020, Emerald Publishing Limited