Criminal behaviour on detection and penalty: an experimental evidence from drug market game

Abstract

Purpose

The economic theory of crime states that crime can be prevented by either increasing the probability of being detected or increasing penalties. However, individual responses to fines and imprisonment may vary, and corruption can reduce both the probability of being detected and punishment costs. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of corruption on crime prevention.

Design/methodology/approach

This study used an experiment to investigate the effects of criminalisation and corruption. This study tested whether individuals respond differently to variables on the probability of being detected and punishment costs and whether corruption affects these variables.

Findings

The results of this study demonstrated that increasing the probability of being detected initially reduces crime rates more efficiently than increasing penalties, then the efficiency gradually reduces, and that corruption reduces the effectiveness of detection and punishment.

Research limitations/implications

Ineffective corruption prevention is not solely attributed to corrupt police, as illicit payments and personal connections also contribute to corruption.

Practical implications

Policymakers and law enforcement agencies should focus on preventive measures by increasing the chance of being detected, creating transparency and encouraging public participation to address corruption problems thoroughly.

Originality/value

This research conducted in Thailand investigates the effectiveness of crime-prevention mechanisms and considers the impact of corruption. This study offers insights into how criminals perceive detection and punishment costs under different social-political environments.

Citation

Chaiwat, T. and Yomnak, T. (2024), "Criminal behaviour on detection and penalty: an experimental evidence from drug market game", Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 31 No. 1, pp. 135-145. https://doi.org/10.1108/JFC-04-2023-0091