Abstract
Purpose
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether a Nash equilibrium of a two-country trading economy is symmetry-breaking or not.
Design/methodology/approach
The approach to tackle this topic is a theoretical treatment by the general equilibrium trade theory and game theory.
Findings
If each government's domestic policy serving private production is diminishing to the private production scale, the Nash equilibrium is not symmetry-breaking.
Originality/value
In the existing study of Chatterjee (2017), a similar result is derived by focusing on the properties of each country's GDP function. The authors, however, consider an economy where each country's PPF is strictly concave and show that the Nash equilibrium uniquely exists and this equilibrium is symmetry.
Keywords
Citation
Shinozaki, T., Tawada, M. and Yanagihara, M. (2023), "Symmetry-breaking and trade in neoclassical economies with domestic policies having diminishing effect to production scale", Fulbright Review of Economics and Policy, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 128-137. https://doi.org/10.1108/FREP-04-2023-0016
Publisher
:Emerald Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2023, Tsuyoshi Shinozaki, Makoto Tawada and Mitsuyoshi Yanagihara
License
Published in Fulbright Review of Economics and Policy. Published by Emerald Publishing Limited. This article is published under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) licence. Anyone may reproduce, distribute, translate and create derivative works of this article (for both commercial and non-commercial purposes), subject to full attribution to the original publication and authors. The full terms of this licence may be seen at http://creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode
1. Introduction
One of the resent issues of game theories is to introduce a new behavioral norm of players called as the Kantian behavior into game. The late Professor Ngo Van Long had an interest in games, where both Nashian and Kantian players coexist and examined the Kant-Nash equilibrium. And he explored the broad applicability of this equilibrium approach by the analyses of various interesting and realistic economic problems in industrial organization, global environment, public policies, etc. in Long (2016, 2017, 2018, 2020a, b, 2022) and Grafton, Kompas, and Long (2017) [1]. There is, however, another recent application of game theories as a powerful tool to investigate symmetry-breaking equilibrium. The present paper is concerned with this topic in general equilibrium trading economies with reciprocal reaction between governments.
It is often observed that similar countries do not necessarily adopt the same domestic policies. Matsuyama (2002) advocates the idea of a symmetry-breaking equilibrium for this phenomenon and formalizes it properly by discussing the stability property of dynamic equilibria. In the context of international trade, Chatterjee (2017) focuses on this topic in the framework of Heckscher–Ohlin economies and inspects the condition for a symmetry-breaking equilibrium to emerge. She follows the work of Amit, Garcia, & Knaff (2010) treating this topic as a lattice programing and concentrates attention on the properties of the GDP function to ensure the symmetry-breaking to appear. On the other hand, Suga, Tawada, & Yanase (2022) deals with a Ricardian type of the trading economy, where the domestic policy is introduced as a source of increasing external economies to the private production and examines what kind of symmetry-breaking arises in a precise manner where they illustrate the graphs of each country’s response function.
In the present paper, we consider a trading model of the Ricardian type in the sense that only one primary factor exists. And we show that the Nash equilibrium of the domestic policy game between governments is unique and symmetric between identical countries if the domestic policies of each country serve for private production but their effects are diminishing along with the production expansion. Although Chatterjee (2017) inspects under what circumstances the trading equilibrium is necessarily symmetry, the analysis is focused solely on the properties of the country’s GDP function and abstract about a concrete image on what sort of economies to assure the equilibrium to be symmetry [2]. Our analysis will make full use of the country’s production frontier as well as the world production frontier to distinguish the circumstances where a unique symmetry equilibrium exists from those where a symmetry-breaking equilibrium arises.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 proposes the model. The main analysis and its extension are carried out in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. The last section provides conclusion.
2. Model
Consider a trading world with two countries, two goods and one primary factor exist. Two countries are Home and Foreign, two goods are good 1 and good 2 and one primary factor is labor. Two countries are assumed to be identical with respect to preferences, technologies and the labor endowment. In this section, we describe mainly the economy of the Home country.
The production functions of two goods are expressed by
So, the effect of this type of policies is diminishing as production scale expands. Hence
The execution of the domestic policy of the level
Suppose that perfect competition prevails in the good and labor markets. Thus the private firms behave as a profit maximizer under perfect competition. In order to finance the policy cost to execute
The country’s aggregate utility function is given by
Now suppose the government executes the domestic policy of level
Since
Consider the Foreign country which is assumed to be identical to the Home country. The assumption implies that equations (1) to (4) are supposed to hold in the Foreign country as well.
First of all, the Home and Foreign governments decide the levels of the domestic policies as
Because of (8),
Home government determines the level of
Under trade between countries,
Likewise, the optimal level of Foreign
We proceed to the simultaneous determination of
3. Analysis
We begin with the examination of Home’s production possibility frontier (PPF). The PPF is defined as the upper boundary of the production possibility set,
Let the PPF under a given level of
The autarkic equilibrium of the Home is indicated by
For the government maximizing the country’s welfare by means of
The assumption that the Home and Foreign are identical implies that the shape of the PPF is the same between these countries. Then the world PPF becomes strictly concave, where the world PPF is the upper boundary of the world production possibility set,
Because of the identical PPF between Home and Foreign, the world PPF becomes strictly concave and any point on the frontier corresponds a common
Next, we assume the world welfare under trade to be
With respect to
In this figure, the production point
In what follows, it is shown that the Nash equilibrium
Next, we suppose a strategic pair
There is a positive amount of trade under
Since two countries are identical, it is also true that
Finally, we confirm that
Therefore we have
4. Extension
In the previous sections, we treated the economy where there are two goods, one primary factor and one domestic policy in each country. Now we extend this framework by allowing arbitrary numbers of goods, factors and policies. So we assume that there are
The production function of good
The execution of the domestic policy
The full employment conditions of primary factors are
Under these suppositions, the PPF(
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered a world economy where there are two identical countries, two goods and one primary factor and the government of each country executes a domestic policy in order to maximize the national welfare. In particular, each government is supposed to determine the level of the domestic policy strategically by taking the policy level of the other country into account under trade. The domestic policy of each country is supposed to serve for the private production in that country and the policy effect is diminishing according to the production expansion. Then it was shown that there is a unique Nash trading equilibrium of the policy game between two governments and the equilibrium level of policy is the same between countries. In order to derive this result, use is made of the world production frontier as well as each country’s production frontier, which enabled us to capture the circumstances where the symmetry Nash equilibrium emerges. We should notice that, if the country PPF is concave, the general equilibrium under trade becomes Pareto optimum [8]. Moreover, there is no trade at that equilibrium if two trading countries are completely symmetric. Therefore, our analysis suggests that the essential source of symmetry-breaking is the inefficiency of the trading general equilibrium. We further generalized the framework by allowing arbitrary numbers of goods, factors and policies and asserted that the same result carries over in this generalized framework.
Concerning the topic of symmetry-breaking, Suga et al. (2022) employ another model, where the domestic policy is assumed to yield the increasing returns to scale effect to the private production. Then they derived that any Nash equilibrium becomes symmetry-breaking, that is, the policy level differs between countries. A main source of the difference in the result is the difference in the shape of the country’s production possibility frontier and thus the world production frontier. In the case of Suga et al. (2022), the PPF is strictly convex to the origin while, in our case, it is strictly concave.
Chatterjee (2017) investigates the circumstances where the symmetry-breaking appears in the Heckscher and Ohlin trading framework with the assumption that the country’s payoff function is twice continuously differentiable with respect to strategic policy variables. Since the Ricardian type of trading economies, specialization is general in equilibrium and the differentiability property is difficult to be assured. Thus Chatterjee’s analysis is hardly applicable. On the other hand, there is an interesting model of Clarida and Findlay (1992), which might fit Chatterjee’s case. They accommodated a government policy into the specific-factor model inheriting the Heckscher–Ohlin spirit and discussed comparative advantage in trade. Succeeding their analysis, Tawada, Suga, & Yanase (2022) pointed out a possibility that the country’s PPF becomes concave-convex-concave. Chatterjee’s analysis strongly suggests that a symmetry-breaking equilibrium appears in this case. Although the Nash equilibrium is necessarily symmetric between identical countries in the Heckscher–Ohlin model with decreasing returns to scale policies, the country’s PPF has a convex portion in general in the case where the domestic policies are of the increasing returns to scale type [9]. Therefore, the symmetry-breaking Nash equilibrium might appear in the case of IRS policies. We need a detailed and precise analysis for those cases in future.
Figures
Notes
In fact, Professor Long has been paid rigorous attention on the wide area of game theory including dynamic game theory, applications of game theory to natural resources, environmental issues and industrial organization and performed the great academic contribution by vast publications over his research career. Among many of his publications, his most recent works in these fields are, for example, Long, Prieuer, Tidball, & Puzon (2017), Benchekroun & Long (2018), Yanase & Long (2021), Laussel, Long, & Resende (2022) and Colombo, Labrecciosa, & Long (2022).
See Proposition 1 of Chatterjee (2017) that, if aggregate income is concave in policy, no asymmetric Nash equilibrium exists and that, if aggregate income is sufficiently convex in own policy, any Nash equilibrium is asymmetric in the open economy.
Following Clarida and Findlay (1992), we interpret
We suppose that the model is game theoretic. So, once after the government sets the level of the public policy, the private production takes place under given level of
See Tawada (1980) for this fact.
See Tawada and Yanase (2021) for the condition to satisfy this assumption.
See Tawada (1980) for the fact that the country’s PPF is strictly concave under arbitrary numbers of goods, factors and policies.
In order for the general equilibrium to be Pareto optimum, we need not only the concavity of the PPF but also the production efficiency condition that the price line is tangent to the PPF at the equilibrium. As shown in our model, this latter condition is satisfied as well. If there are market failures such as externalities or imperfect competitions, symmetry-breaking may emerge even under the concave PPF in the trading economy with two symmetry countries.
See Tawada and Abe (1984) and Okamoto (1985) for some exceptional cases, where the country’s PPF is globally concave under the Heckscher–Ohlin framework.
References
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Further reading
Manning, R., & McMillan, J. (1979). Public intermediate goods, production possibilities and international trade. Canadian Journal of Economics, 12(2), 243–57.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research No. 19K01679 and No. 20K01605. The authors thank two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions.