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Building world-class enterprises though mixed-ownership reform: explaining performance differences in minority and majority state-owned enterprises

Hongwei Liao (Center for China Public Sector Economy Research, Jilin University, Changchun, China and School of Economics, Jilin University, Changchun, China)
Mingyue Li (School of Economics, Jilin University, Changchun, China)
Ari Van Assche (Department of International Business, HEC Montréal, Montréal, Canada)
Jiaojiao Zheng (School of Economics, Renmin University of China, Beijing, China)
Liangping Yang (School of Economics, Jilin University, Changchun, China)

Chinese Management Studies

ISSN: 1750-614X

Article publication date: 15 February 2022

Issue publication date: 1 August 2022

513

Abstract

Purpose

In the context of China’s efforts to build world-class enterprises through mixed-ownership reform, this study aims to build an agency theory framework to analyze the differential relation between ownership structure and firm performance in majority versus minority state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It also evaluates the differential influence that political connectedness has on firm performance in the two types of SOEs.

Design/methodology/approach

Using a panel data set of Chinese state-controlled mixed-ownership enterprises covering the period 2010–2019, this paper uses ordinary least squares, random-effects, fixed-effects and three stage least squares regression analysis to study the differential impact of ownership structure and political connectedness on firm performance in majority versus minority SOEs.

Findings

In minority SOEs, firm performance is positively related to the ownership share of the largest private shareholder and state ownership positively moderates this relation. Furthermore, minority SOEs with a politically connected chairman perform worse than those with a politically connected chairman. In majority SOEs, there is no relation between the ownership share of the largest private shareholder and firm performance. In addition, majority SOEs with a politically connected chairman perform similar to those without a politically connected chairman.

Originality/value

The theoretical framework demonstrates that agency problems are substantially different in minority versus majority SOEs and that this influences how changes in ownership structure and in the type of chairman that is assigned affect firm performance. The empirical analysis confirms these predictions.

Keywords

Acknowledgements

Funding: This research was supported by the National Social Science Foundation of China (17BJY164)-titled by “Transformation of State-Owned Assets Supervision from ‘Managing Assets’ to ‘Managing Capital’”.

Citation

Liao, H., Li, M., Van Assche, A., Zheng, J. and Yang, L. (2022), "Building world-class enterprises though mixed-ownership reform: explaining performance differences in minority and majority state-owned enterprises", Chinese Management Studies, Vol. 16 No. 4, pp. 741-764. https://doi.org/10.1108/CMS-03-2021-0084

Publisher

:

Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2022, Emerald Publishing Limited

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