

APPENDIX

Prof More's laid out his ethical conclusions and Noemata in his 1667 book *Echiridion Ethicum*, which was published in Latin. That content was later released in translation to English in 1690. Some of the content most relevant to this book are mentioned as follows.¹

Noema I

* It is good that it is acceptable, pleasant, and agreeable to any perceptive life, to the degree of this life, and conjoined with the preservation of the perceiver.

Noema II

But that which is ungrateful, unpleasant, and inappropriate for any person's perceptive life, or that of this degree of life; and if finally conjoined with the destruction of the perceiver, the worst of all.

For example, if anything offended not only the ears or the eyes, but would also induce deafness and blindness, this would be very bad. But it would be an ill-prepared evil, though the sight would only weaken or the hearing would become impaired. The same applies to other faculties.

Noema III

Of the species or degrees of perceptible lives which are found in the universe of things, some are more excellent and more excellent than others.

Noema IV

One good can be more excellent in nature, duration, or both.

This is self-evident. It can, however, be illustrated by this inconvenience,

¹ H. More, *Enchiridion Ethicum*, Benjamin Tooke, 1690. The English Translation of 1690, or An Account of Virtue, Dr Henry More's Abridgement of Morals, Put into English, The Facsimile Text Society, 1930.

that one life would not otherwise be more excellent than the other, nor one happiness greater than the other. Therefore, God, Angel, Man, Horse, and any one of the most vile Crimsons would be equally happy. Which no one can in any way admit, unless plainly insane. Concerning Duration, even the smallest doubt or difficulty can arise.

Noema V

That which is good must be chosen; but the evil must be shunned; the less we must endure the evil, lest we should undergo the greater.

Noema VI

In that which we ourselves have not yet experienced, we must be believed to those who profess to have experienced, only they live a life conformed to their profession, and no treachery steals away the catch of any worldly advantage.

Noema VII

The absence of the good which is related to eight is more eligible than the presence of the evil which is similar to eight in respect to weight and duration; and yet so much the more eligible, as much as the evil exceeds the good in weight and duration.

Noema VIII

That which is to be certain ought to have the character of the present, as that which will someday in fact occupy us as present as present. And there is an unequal ratio of that which is very probable in the future.

Noema IX

The less outstanding goods are measured by the more excellent as to their weight and duration.

Noema X

The present good must be omitted or reduced from the probable expectation of a future good infinitely more excellent than the present in respect to weight and duration; and therefore much more than certain expectations.

Noema XI

The present evil is to be tolerated, in order to avoid the probability that the future evil is infinitely greater than the present in respect to weight and duration.

Noema XIII

We must pursue the greatest and most perfect Good with the greatest zeal, and lesser Goods with a zeal proportionately less. Nor must we subordinate greater Goods to less, but less to greater.

Noema XII

The free prejudgment of the affections judges the mind more rightly than when it is entangled or disturbed by the impressions of any bodily passions.

For just as the cloudy and stormy sea does not transmit light; the mind is so disturbed and obscured by the passions, that it scarcely admits even the clearest reason. By this similitude Boethius brilliantly illustrates the matter in that poem, "When the stars can shed black clouds no light, &c. It is indeed longer than that it ought to be transcribed here."

3. And these are almost the Noemata which cause prudence, temperance, and fortitude to be engendered in the soul, which pertain to duty toward ourselves. The things that follow look to the duty toward others, think men and God and virtue, and therefore are the foundations of Sincerity, Justice, Gratitude, Mercy, and Compassion. For piety is ranked among the moral virtues, since God is knowable by the light of nature.

Noema XIV

Whatever good you wish to be done to you in the given circumstances, you must do the same to another in the same circumstances, as far as possible without causing injury to any third party.

Noema XV

You ought to refrain yourself from doing that to another, as long as it is possible without injury to any third party.

Noema XVI

Good is to be offended to the good, not to the evil.

Noema XVII

It is good for a man to have where he lives well and happily.

Noema XVIII

If it is good for one man to have the means to live well and happily, it follows from a certain analogy and plainly mathematical, that it is twice as much better to have two men, three times as three, a thousand times as a thousand, and so on.

Noema XIX

It is better for one man to live not delicacies than the other so calamitous and miserably.

Noema XX

It is good to obey a magistrate in minor matters, even without any fear of punishment.

Noema XXI

It is better to obey God than men in our own desires.

Noema XXII

It is good and just that it be given to each his own, and that his use and possession may be permitted him without molestation.

Noema XXIII

It is, however, clear that a man can behave himself in such a way that what is his acquisition or gift may cease to be his right.

CHAP. VI. OF ACQUIRING THE REDUCTIVE VIRTUES; AND FIRST OF THOSE, WHICH REFER TO JUSTICE

1. Among the Virtues call'd *Reductive*; those more especially shine out, which have reference to Justice: As

- Liberality,
- Magnificence,
- Veracity,
- Gratitude,
- Candor,
- Urbanity,
- Fidelity,
- Modesty,
- Humanity,
- Hospitality,
- Friendship,
- Civility,
- Affability,
- Officiousness.

Liberality is not to be neglected: Since, on the one hand, we shew thereby, that our Souls are not contracted to the bare admiration of Wealth; Nor our Minds, on the other hand, so stupid, as not to understand the true Use and Ends thereof.

Magnificence is prais'd by its own works; since these bring Benefit to the Publick, Ornament to the World, and Variety to the Histories of the Time.

2. VERACITY must be our constant Inmate and Companion: For 'tis the worst of Characters to be a noted Lyar. There is no Quicksand, or infected Air, more frightful to the Traveler, nor any Wizzard more dangerous to be met withal, than an accomplish'd Lyar. He will lead you, like a Ghost, into dangerous Paths; and, when you are wandring quite out of your Way, he will be sure to leave you in the Dark.

However, 'tis strange to see how the Masters in this Talent, will yet set up for Men of Prudence. They are indeed wise enough to know that every Vice must bear a virtuous Name; and that Fraud and Cunning, will never stand alone. 'Tis as with Strumpets, who affect to be seen at Church among the Matrons: but as they are the more abhorr'd herein for their Impudence, as well as Vice; so ought it be with these plausible Circumventors. There is even a Sect of these, who also set up for Wits; they think there can be no greater Excellency than in the way call'd *Bantering*: Surely the Man must be very dull, that cannot Deceive, if he but resolve to Lye. Yet as he that will deceive when he can, shews a Mind that is vile and abject: So the truly prudent and generous Man, is he that will be Honest in the dark: He that will be as just, when 'tis in his power to be otherwise, as if it were not. But whoever notes the Events of things shall see, that Knaves and Hypocrites are expos'd to shame, and end their Lives obscurely; whereas the just and vertuous sort endure, and their Reputation still shines forth as at the Noon-day. Every counterfeit thing must be short-liv'd.

Fidelity is much to be cultivated; and how could Human Society consist without it: since to keep Promises, and to restore what is deposited with us, are the top branches and conspicuous parts of *Justice*.

Hence also we may be convinc'd how much it imports us to consider well of Gratitude. For every good turn done us is, as it were a Pledg deposited in our trust and keeping: And surely he that repays it not back, as soon as he can, is guilty of *Infidelity*. Nay, *Gratitude* is so remarkable a part of *Justice*, that whoever has the heart to violate this Bond is thought capable (might he do it with Impunity) of trampling on all the Laws of the World.

Now who would incur this Character, or draw himself under so dismal a Guilt? There is certainly no Monster that a Man should more abhor, than this Monster of *Ingratitude*.

3. As to the shew and expression of *Candor* in our Converse with Men, there are great Motives for it. First, Because the Errors of most Men are Errors of Ignorance: and yet, even among these Errors, their Minds often labor to bring forth Truth and good Works; a Birth which indeed we ought kindly to assist, by interpreting favorably all their Actions, and affording them the very best appearances we can. For we do, by this soft Temper, help on Peace, and the cementing of Men's Minds toward a bond of Unity: which is so worthy a part, that all Men ought to endeavor it.

4. FOR *Urbanity*, we must not be so Morose, as not to hear and bear the Jest of others (and sometimes tart ones too) altho we are not good at Jestings our selves. In truth, he that is dexterous in Raillery, has found a Remedy to laugh away his Labor, and a very good Sauce against the fatigues of Life. For tho it was not Nature's Intention, to fit us only for Sport and Pastime; Yet these, doubtless, are lawful in their seasons, just as sleep, and other Refreshments, to the Body and the Mind: provided always that things of Moment are not obstructed by them. 'Tis to this sense that *Cicero* speaks in his *Offices*, *That the ways of Jestings are very different: the one, Sawey, Rustic, Impious, and Obscene; the other, Elegant, Candid, Ingenious, and Pleasant*. And surely, 'tis this last which is recommended to us. However, if something herein should drop, so quick and pleasing to the Company as to cause Laughter for the smart which it reflects; he that feels it (being a good Man) will not so much vex to see, that small defects are insulted over, as have cause to rejoice, that his greater Virtues are at the same time applauded: For he hears the worst that can be said of him, since Adversaries are still known to shoot their longest and sharpest Arrows. And here we refer to what (in our *First Book*) was said of the *Interpretation of Passions*; which may farther illustrate this Point. * But if some rude and ill-natur'd Man shall perhaps bear-over-hard upon us, and both jest and sting together; We must then do what we can, to cure the subject matter, and draw out that Core, in which his Darts are fix'd.

5. MODESTY must attend all our Actions; 'tis the Flower, * the Beauty of *Jesutice*, and even its chief Perfection: This we have already set forth, and it needs not be repeated.

But *Humanity* does challenge a most principal regard among all the other Virtues. We are all, as it were, linked in one common chain of Equality; nor is one man to think himself so very preferable to another; when, in things of Passion and of Reason, in Death and Immortality, we seem all to share alike. He therefore that contemns another, and forgets that way of Treatment, which *Candor* and *Humanity* demands, he seems to give Sentence against himself. For 'twill be as lawful at another time, and when Circumstances are alike, to refuse to him those common Perquisites of Human Nature; seeing in his turn he refused them to others. So that whoever arrogates to himself a great Preeminence above his Fellow-Creatures, does but expose his Vanity, and takes pains to be Ridiculous. Let no man, of how mean a Condition soever, if he be a good Man, and has not by his Follies lost all Title to the Rights of Human Nature, be treated with Contumely. 'Tis the saying of *Heraclitus*, *Enter, Gentlemen, even here the Gods inhabit*: Which may truly be said of the poorest Man living, so that his Heart be but sound and Just. For (besides that Prerogative, which is common to Mankind) such a one should be regarded with Love and Tenderness, and as it were some Creature that were even Holy and Divine.

6. FOR *Hospitality*, it will stand less in need of Recommendation, as 'tis a manifest part of *Humanity*. It seems to be most needful there, where Strangers are liable to be ill us'd by the Natives, and where they want the things of Accommodation they were us'd to find at Home. These therefore we should strive to Help and Succor, in all they can need at our Hands: Not forgetting that even Holy Angels are thus employ'd, whom we ought to imitate. For they, during this Earthly pilgrimage of our Souls; do seasonably step in, both to relieve and succor us, when we are most distress'd.
7. FOR what concerns *Friendship* and *Friends*, these are carefully to be Acquir'd; and not barely as Ornaments, but as Bulwarks in Human Life. If you light on such as deserve your fervent Love; place it rather on their Virtues, than their Persons, which are both mutable and mortal. Let not your *Friendship* consist, in soft and unprofitable strains; nor in

vehemency of Passion, which would bring many a storm and disorder to your Mind. But let the Character of it be *Sincere* and *Constant*, and such as fulfills all the Duties appertaining thereto, with a chearful and officious Benignity.

8. LASTLY, As to *Civility*, *Affability*, and *Officiousness*; these are all to be regarded, not only as Credentials, which procure us Fame and good Will: but they very often become the very Essential Knots of that Peace and Friendship which we enjoy. Therefore let no Man neglect, and much less despise these smaller Virtues; which often, as smaller Wires, sustain much weight. We do by them live more pleasantly among our Neighbors; our security becomes the greater and our Favor and Credit with Men is there|by increas'd. And who wou'd not wear such things about him, as make him welcom where-e'er he comes, and cost him nothing the Carriage?

CHAP. IX. OF THAT MEDIOCRITY, IN WHICH VERTUE DOES CONSIST: AND OF THE TRUE MEASURE OF SUCH MEDIOCRITY

1. THAT Vertue lies in a *Mediocrity* is not quite untrue, * if rightly understood: Yet as some introduce Vertue attended, on each hand, with opposite Vices; and just as it were a Rose placed between two Nettles: This, we do confess, were a pretty Show, but it cannot possibly hold in every Case.
2. FOR in the Case of *Justice*, where a Man takes no more than what is of right his due; this is plainly opposite to that part which is vicious, and where a Man takes more than what is his due. But here if a Man takes less; this surely seems no Vice, but rather a sort of *Generosity*, or *Modesty*. So again in the Conferring of Rewards, to bestow less than was agreed for, hath as much of *Injustice*, as to give according to Proportion is just: Yet to bestow more largely than was agreed for, is not, on the other hand, *Injustice*, but rather *Liberality*. So also, in the way of Buying and Selling; the overweight that is thrown in to get a Customer's good Will, altho either in Weight or Measure, it exceed the Bargain, yet surely this has nothing of *Injustice* in it.
3. MOREOVER unto *Prudence* (which doubtless is a Moral Vertue) there is only *Imprudence* to be oppos'd, which is the Defect of *Prudence*. So

to *Sincerity* is nothing opposite but *Insincerity*, or at large *Hypocrisie*, which exceeds or falls short of the Perfection of *Sincerity*. So *Patience*, *Contenance*, and *Suffering*, do only go lame (as we say) on the one side, as namely, by *Impatience*, *Incontinence*, and by *Effeminacy*: So *Temperance* by *Intemperance*. And therefore to put (which some do) a sort of *Insensibility*, to answer as an opposite Vice on the other side, is quite without Reason. F ● ... (as *Andronicus* notes from *Aristotle*) '*tis scarce within Reach of Human Nature to be Insensible to such a Pitch:*'* And if any Man were so, this would look much more like a Disease of the Body, than a Vice of the Soul.

BUT should it happen, that the Power of the Soul could be so far extended, as to be able to weigh down, and even extinguish the sense of every Corporeal Pain and Pleasure; this certainly were so far from being a Defect in the Soul, that it would rather amount to a wonderful Vertue and Perfection. And to abuse such Perfection would argue either *Insincerity*, or *Imprudence*. However, if any Man will needs call it an *Intemperate sort of Temperance*, I will not much contend in the Matter.

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