Mobile termination benchmarking: the case of Namibia
Abstract
Purpose
This paper seeks to contribute to the debate about the regulation of termination rates in the context of Africa.
Design/methodology/approach
The methodology is based on analysis of secondary data and a case study of a regulatory intervention in Namibia and its impact.
Findings
Mobile call termination is a monopoly and not one side of a two‐sided market. Cost‐based termination rates increase competition between operators and lead to lower prices, more subscribers and more investment.
Research limitations/implications
The case of Namibia is presented as an example of termination rate benchmarking as an alternative regulatory strategy to overcome regulatory and institutional bottlenecks in Africa.
Practical implications
African regulators are presented with a tool for removing market distortions.
Social implications
Cost based termination rates will lead to lower retail prices and allow more people to use mobile phones.
Originality/value
The paper presents theoretical and empirical evidence against the waterbed effect and the two‐sided market argument.
Keywords
Citation
Stork, C. (2011), "Mobile termination benchmarking: the case of Namibia", info, Vol. 13 No. 3, pp. 5-31. https://doi.org/10.1108/14636691111131420
Publisher
:Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2011, Emerald Group Publishing Limited