On the incentive for price‐taking behavior
Abstract
Price‐taking has long been mistakenly regarded as an inferior firm behavior in an imperfectly competitive market. This scenario is challenged when a “Naiver’s Paradox” is shown to exist in an oligopolic market where all firms produce the same product with the same technology (cost structure). It is shown that a firm behaving as a naive price‐taker with ignorance of its output impact on the market will perform no worse or even better than its rivals in terms of profits achieved, where the latter are assumed to take “Cournot”, “relative profit” or other more advanced strategies. More significantly, when the number of firms in the market is large, a price‐taker may achieve higher profit not only in a relative sense, but also in an absolute sense. Such paradoxical outcome is generic, for it results from neither ad hoc assumptions on market structure nor on information sets, but from the conventionally granted “convexity” assumption on cost functions. An analogous phenomenon is observed for oligopsony market.
Keywords
Citation
Huang, W. (2002), "On the incentive for price‐taking behavior", Management Decision, Vol. 40 No. 7, pp. 682-692. https://doi.org/10.1108/00251740210438517
Publisher
:MCB UP Ltd
Copyright © 2002, MCB UP Limited