Corporate governance mechanisms and performance related CEO turnover
Institutional Approach to Global Corporate Governance: Business Systems and Beyond
ISBN: 978-1-84855-320-0, eISBN: 978-1-84855-321-7
Publication date: 1 November 2008
Abstract
This study investigates the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on performance related turnover. Our results indicate that smaller boards and institutional block holders are positively related to the likelihood of performance related turnover. CEOs that also hold the position of the chairman of the board or belong to a founding family face lower likelihood of turnover. CEO stock ownership is negatively related to turnover and CEOs who own 3 percent or more of their company stock face a significantly lower likelihood of performance related turnover. Moreover, protection from external control market has no effect either on the likelihood of turnover.
Citation
Chakraborty, A. and Sheikh, S. (2008), "Corporate governance mechanisms and performance related CEO turnover", Choi, J.J. and Dow, S. (Ed.) Institutional Approach to Global Corporate Governance: Business Systems and Beyond (International Finance Review, Vol. 9), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 143-161. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1569-3767(08)09007-9
Publisher
:Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2008, Emerald Group Publishing Limited