INCREASING MARKET DISCIPLINE ON BANKS: SUBORDINATED DEBT AND BANK LOAN SALES

Abstract

While subordinated debt can be used to increase market discipline on banks by playing a corporate governance role in the presence of a federal safety net that encourages risk taking, it also has implications for banks’ loan sales. Using two measures of banks’ loan sales activity, we find greater proportions of subordinated debt increase the likelihood that banks engage in loan sales activity, and are associated with greater proportions of loan sales. Our results have implications about banks’ lending efficiency as well as their transparency and disclosure policies that could play a role in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.

Citation

Chen, A.H., Robinson, K.J. and Siems, T.F. (2003), "INCREASING MARKET DISCIPLINE ON BANKS: SUBORDINATED DEBT AND BANK LOAN SALES", Research in Finance (Research in Finance, Vol. 20), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 81-97. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0196-3821(03)20005-8