Price-fixing Overcharges: Legal and Economic Evidence

Abstract

This paper surveys published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 1,040 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary finding is that the median long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 25.0%:18.8% for domestic cartels and 31.0% for international cartels. Cartel overcharges are positively skewed, pushing the mean overcharge for all successful cartels to 43.4%. Convicted cartels are on average as equally effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels, but bid-rigging conduct does display somewhat lower mark-ups than price-fixing cartels. These findings suggest that optimal deterrence requires that monetary penalties ought to be increased.

Citation

Connor, J.M. (2007), "Price-fixing Overcharges: Legal and Economic Evidence", Zerbe, R.O. and Kirkwood, J.B. (Ed.) Research in Law and Economics (Research in Law and Economics, Vol. 22), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 59-153. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0193-5895(06)22004-9