A difficult birth: dissent, opposition, and murder in the rise of mexico's partido de la revolucion democratica (PRD)

Abstract

This essay studies the social causes of political and electoral homicide in Mexico's democratization in the 1988–2000 period. Three main plausible hypotheses are tested with a qualitative and quantitative data set as potential explanations for these political-electoral homicides: (1) the “peasant-landlord conflict” thesis which explains this violence against peasants as a manifestation of underlying agrarian struggles over land and wages; (2) the “violence as a political strategy” thesis which assumes political-electoral homicide is the unfortunate response of the authorities to the violent party tactics of an opposition political party; and (3) the “rise of a leftist opposition” thesis which explains political-electoral homicide as the result of social disruption caused by the PRI-regime's loss of its traditional populist social base. The results suggest that the rise of an organized leftist opposition was perceived as a threat to certain agrarian interests, and to local PRI political, police and electoral control over the municipalities in question. The relatively high incidence of “paid” political contract killings, and/or killings by anonymous assailants against individuals engaged in everyday social activities at the time of their death points toward the use of homicide as a control mechanism to protect, maintain and to minimize threats and resistance to existing political and economic group interests.

Citation

Schatz, S. (2001), "A difficult birth: dissent, opposition, and murder in the rise of mexico's partido de la revolucion democratica (PRD)", Coy, P.G. (Ed.) Political Opportunities Social Movements, and Democratization (Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, Vol. 23), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 255-296. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0163-786X(01)80024-0