Lenient Policy Proposal for the Struggle Against Illegal Immigration

Abstract

Policy strategies directed against illegal immigration have largely concentrated on border and domestic enforcement. This paper suggests that host countries could consider a more lenient approach: contributing to the deportation cost of self-reporting illegal immigrants. The increase in illegal immigration that such a reward might bring about is shown to be more than offset by the rise in the number of self-reporting illegal immigrants leaving the rich country, with a concomitant decrease in the number of remaining illegal immigrants. An added advantage of this policy is that the self-reporting immigrants would be predominantly the relatively lower socio-economic group. When adopting this policy, the rich country must choose the appropriate mix of two policy means: funds allocated to strengthening its border and domestic control; and rewards to self-reporting illegal immigrants.

Citation

Kahana, N. and Lecker, T. (2006), "Lenient Policy Proposal for the Struggle Against Illegal Immigration", Polachek, S.W., Chiswick, C. and Rapoport, H. (Ed.) The Economics of Immigration and Social Diversity (Research in Labor Economics, Vol. 24), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 167-175. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0147-9121(05)24005-0