Board composition and corporate social responsibility: uncovering the effects of co-opted directors

Abstract

Purpose

Prior research shows that co-opted directors adversely impact many corporate outcomes, yet little is known about these directors' impact on CSR performance. The authors investigate whether and how co-opted boards affect the firm's CSR score and component CSR scores.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors use panel regression models to investigate this study's research questions and address endogeneity concerns using the system generalized method of moments (system GMM) and a quasi-natural experiment.

Findings

The authors report new evidence showing that co-opted boards negatively impact CSR performance based on the CSR score. Results identify board characteristics that accentuate or moderate the effect of co-option on the CSR score and show that board independence, the presence of women on the board, and CEO duality positively and significantly impact the CSR score. These findings are robust across alternative measures of co-option and in the results of models addressing endogeneity concerns. An extended analysis utilizing CSR component scores reveals a significant negative impact of co-option on the environment component score using various measures of co-option and on employee relations, product quality, and human rights component scores using selected measures of co-option.

Practical implications

Findings have implications for board structuring and composition for firms aiming at improving their CSR score.

Originality/value

The study provides new evidence on the impact of co-opted boards on CSR performance. The results help inform stakeholders such as policymakers, executives and directors, shareholders, and capital market participants on how board composition affects socially responsible activities and performance and identify CSR component areas that require attention.

Citation

El Saleh, A.I. and Jurdi, D.J. (2023), "Board composition and corporate social responsibility: uncovering the effects of co-opted directors", Journal of Accounting Literature, Vol. ahead-of-print No. ahead-of-print. https://doi.org/10.1108/JAL-02-2023-0019